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THE "MENDACIOUS" COMMON-LAW MORTGAGE
D.P. Waddilove'
The common-law mortgage has been much maligned. Legal historians have called
it everything from "clumsy" to "mendacious." Following their lead, the current
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages and the leading treatise on mortgage law
denounce the modern incarnation of the common-law mortgage - the "title theory" of
mortgages - in favor of the "lien theory ". As many states have adopted this view, the
common-law mortgage has been nearly eliminatedfrom the modern legal landscape.
But the consensus i  wrong. Critics of the common-law mortgage have relied upon
a superficial view of the device. They appreciated neither the background law that
explained its basic contours, nor the changes it underwent over time. This article
exposes their misunderstandings by placing the common-law mortgage in the relevant
doctrinal and social context ofthe turn ofthe seventeenth century. This snapshot shows
how - at the height of the common-law, before quity became amajor aspect of the
legal landscape - the common-law mortgage made perfect sense. It then demonstrates
how well-intentioned interventions by equity judges caused ultimately problematic
changes to the form of the mortgage that scholars and jurists have confused with the
inherent common-law device.
This shows several things. The common-law mortgage was a logical and clever
device, undeserving of the criticism to which it has been subject. Judges should be
wary when disregarding parties' clearly stated intent in contracts. And the modern
theory of basic mortgage doctrine needs reassessment. We also gain a diferent view
of a fundamental legal institution and greater understanding of legal history.
'Fellow, the Project on the Foundations of Private Law at the Harvard Law School. My thanks to
Professor Sir John Baker, Professor Samuel Bray, Dr Patrick Goold, Professor Thomas Green, Professor
David Ibbetson, Dr Neil Jones, Dr Mike Macnair, Professor Grant Nelson, Dr Peter Turner, Dr Ian Williams,
the University of Cambridge Legal History Seminar, the University of Oxford Legal History Forum, the
participants of the twenty-second British Legal History Conference, and the faculty of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, for their comments on this paper or aspects thereof.
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THE "MENDACIOUS" COMMON-LAW MORTGAGE
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and judges have formed a durable and univocal consensus that the
common-law mortgage is inherently problematic. The great English judge Lord
Macnaghten declared: "[N]o one, I am sure, by the light of nature ever understood an
English [i.e. common-law] mortgage of real estate."2 His colleague Lord Bramwell
referred to mortgages as involving "a system of documents which do not mean what
they say."' The leading English legal historian of all time, Professor F. W. Maitland,
referred disapprovingly to the "clumsy mortgage by way of conditional conveyance"
that was still "incumbering our modern law".4 And he more famously called the
mortgage "one long suppresio veri and suggestiofalsi."s Another great legal historian,
Professor T. F. T. Plucknett, wrote: "The old common law mortgages ... suffered from
the incurable defect that they employed formulas which contradicted the true nature of
the operation-they spoke of feoffinents in fee, and leases for years, when the
transaction was really neither[.]" 6 And he further claimed: "The fact that the mortgage
was not a very satisfactory institution is shown by the continued use of the mediaeval
statutes merchant and staple."' More recently, Professor A. W. B. Simpson wrote that
"mortgages have always pretended to a greater or less [sic] degree to be something
which they are not,"' and he referred disparagingly to the "mendacious legal
mortgage." Professor G. Watt lately echoed such views, declaring: "the mortgage deed
was inherently dishonest."i0 Professor J.J. Rabinowitz summed up such sentiments:
The origin of this obviously artificial device, which does not correspond either
to the true economic significance of the transaction or to the intention of the parties,
has never been satisfactorily explained. Nor is the reason for it quite apparent. Why
should a mortgage, given to secure a debt, take the form of an immediate and
absolute conveyance of the mortgaged property, when what is intended is a
forfeiture of the property to take effect in the future in the case of non-payment of
the mortgage debt?"
Such queries and criticisms are rooted in what appears at first glance to be the
fundamentally backward structure of the mortgage. Whereas its purpose is to allow a
creditor to seize property upon default, a common-law mortgage takes the form of a
grant of legal title to a creditor upon origination of a debt.12 The grant is subject to a
2 Samuel v. Jarrah Timber and Wood Paving Corp. [1904] AC 323 (HL) 326 (appeal taken from Eng.).
3 Salt v. Marquess of Northampton [1892] AC i (HL) i9 (appeal taken from Eng.).
4 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 124 (2d ed. 1898).
5 
F. W. MAITLAND, EQUiTY 269 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1913). Maitland referred to the
law prior to the major land-law reform of 1925.
6 THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNET-r, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 606 (5th ed. 1956).
Id. at 6o8; cf id. at 6o6.
A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 242 (2d ed. 1986).
Id. at 247.
o Gary Watt, The Lie of the Land: Mortgage Law as Legal Fiction, in 4 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY
LAW 73, 73 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2007).
" Jacob J. Rabinowitz, The Common Law Mortgage and the Conditional Bond, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
18o (1943). The author called the conveyance "absolute" because he assumed a defeasance in a separate deed,
but he was fully aware that the mortgage was a conditional grant. Id. at 179; see also Jacob J. Rabinowitz,
The Story of the Mortgage Retold, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 94,94 (1945-r946).
12 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 607; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 122-23; SIMPSON,
supra note 8, at 142, 242; H. D. Hazeltine, General Preface: The Roman Fiducia cum Creditore and the
English Mortgage of R. W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: ITS NATURE, HISTORY AND CONNECTION
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condition that itle will return to the debtor upon repayment.' In other words, a creditor
holds title-i.e. is the owner in the eyes of the law-of property for the duration of a
mortgage. A mortgage debtor-whom one expects is the owner-is not the owner, at
least while the debt is outstanding. The debtor regains title only upon repayment, by
undoing the mortgage grant. In other words, a creditor becomes technical owner of
property before he or she has any real entitlement to it by a grant that is undone if all
goes as planned. This seems backward, if not absurd. Furthermore, common-law
mortgages tended to have certain clauses that everyone knew "do not mean what they
say." 4 Who would have possession during a mortgage, for instance, or when the debt
was actually due, were often stated differently in a mortgage deed than everyone
understood to be intended. Such disjunctions between common expectation and
common appearance of a mortgage inspired criticisms ranging from disapprobation to
condemnation.
The view that the common-law mortgage is inherently problematic is not only
academic orthodoxy; it has also significantly affected the structures of law in operation.
Today different states structure their mortgages differently. Some follow "title theory,"
others follow "lien theory" or "intermediate theory."" Title theory is the common-law
mortgage."' Lien theory allows a debtor to hold title all the way until the completion of
a foreclosure proceeding.'7 Intermediate theory splits the difference by vesting title in
a creditor automatically upon default." "Today fewer than io jurisdictions follow the
title theory."" And most jurisdictions have abandoned it because of the criticisms
above claiming that the common-law mortgage is inherently problematic. The
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, along with the leading treatise on
mortgage law, agree.20 The consensus about the common-law mortgage has therefore
driven it to the brink of extinction.
But the consensus is wrong. When properly understood, the common-law mortgage
is unproblematic; it is merely a straightforward utilization of existing legal structures
to make land a security for a debt. As the Restatement acknowledges, the only way to
understand the common-law mortgage is through English legal history.21 And
examining the history of the mortgage renders it explicable. Within the doctrinal
structures of land title and secured lending of the pure common law-before equity
affected the mortgage-it was explicable and straightforward. After equity assumed an
effectively exclusive jurisdiction over mortgages, they changed - and not for the better;
but this was an effect of equity, not the inherent common-law mortgage.
Why then did the critical consensus arise? First, some scholars and jurists simply
could not get over the fact that a mortgage began with a grant, which did not give
possession, which would be reversed when everything went as planned. But such a
view was unreasonably short sited. At the time the common-law mortgage assumed its
WITH EQUITABLE ESTATES GENERALLY xxxi-Xxxii (1931); J. L. Barton, The Common Law Mortgage, 83 L.
Q. REV. 229 (1967).
1 See authorities cited supra note 12.
1 See Salt v. Marquess of Northampton [1892] AC i (HL) 19 (appeal taken from Eng.).
"See GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 199-210 (6th ed. 2014); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
1 See authorities cited supra note 15.
" See authorities cited supra note 15.
" See authorities cited supra note 15.
19 NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 201.20 
Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a(i) (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a(i) (AM. LAW. INST. 1997). ("English legal
history is crucial to understanding the title theory.").
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form, the prevailing legal structures of remedies and secured lending created a
pervasive risk of encumbrances upon title to land. The value of land title was thus
constantly at risk. To use land as a security required a stable value. A mortgage cleverly
preserved the value of title by handing title over to a creditor and thereby disabling a
borrower, either intentionally or accidentally, from encumbering the title: if the
borrower does not own the land, how can he or she encumber it? A mortgage also
prevented other creditors from reaching the title: the property was the creditor's, not
the debtor's. The reciprocal concern-that a creditor would encumber the title during
the mortgage-was addressed by the common-law doctrine of conditions subsequent,
which nullified any encumbrances made between grant upon condition and operation
of the condition.22 The common-law mortgage, in other words, gave a creditor absolute
priority to a title, preserved its value, and still allowed a borrower to redeem an
unimpaired title. And none of the above analysis was too complicated for contemporary
lawyers-or even lay people-to appreciate. The mortgage was simply the analogue of
one of the most widespread types of financial transaction at the time-a pawn. The
mortgage debtor simply handed over title until he or she repaid a debt, just like
anybody who borrowed upon a pawn-at the time everyone from the king to a
commoner-handed over a valuable item until repayment. In short, the supposedly
backward structure of the mortgage was exactly what allowed it to function as a
security, in exactly the way that everybody commonly borrowed on assets.
Second, scholars and jurists failed to realize that clauses in a mortgage that did not
mean what they say were not a characteristic of the common-law mortgage per se.
Relatively late in its life the common-law mortgage became subject to an effectively
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. While Professor Watt has described
how the Chancery engaged in "barefaced disavowal of the legal form" of mortgages.23
And Professor Simpson summed up the Chancery's jurisdiction thus: "[T]he Chancery
freely interfered with mortgage transactions with a complete indifference to the terms
agreed by the parties; in no branch of the law was the sanctity of agreement less
regarded."24 In response to such treatment, parties came to draft mortgage deeds
differently. They made them positioning devices to obtain particular results in equity.
rather than literal statements of rights and responsibilities: parties knew that literal
terms would not be given effect.25 A gulf thus opened between expression and intent in
mortgages. This gulf grounded many criticisms. But this gulf was a response to judicial
alteration of fundamental premises of contract by equity, not an inherent characteristic
of the common-law mortgage.
In short, the common-law mortgage was not so bad; so our understanding must
change. And changing our understanding matters in several ways. First, and most
basically, we have a new understanding of a fundamental legal institution. The
significance of mortgages both historically and in the present day hardly needs mention.
They have not only been a core aspect of finance since at least the seventeenth century,
but remain suffused throughout the present-day economy.26 Deeply understanding such
22See infra notes 262-263 and accompanying text.
23 See Watt, supra note 1o, at 80.
24 SIMPsON, supra note 8, at 246.
25 See infra section II.
26 By the first quarter of 2018, total outstanding mortgage debt in the United States was just under $15
trillion. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. Sys.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm [https://perma.cc/QTC6-
QHDW]; see also John Patrick Hunt, Should the Mortgage Follow the Note?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 155, 158 (2014)
(noting that "[m]ortgage finance historically has been under-studied relative to its importance").
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an institution has value for its own sake. And that understanding must now take the
form, not of axiomatic criticism, but appreciation. The common-law mortgage was at
least unobjectionable, perhaps even clever.
Second, the basic mortgage doctrine predicated upon now-debunked criticisms
needs re-appraising. Most states and the leading scholarly authorities on mortgages
reject title theory simply because it is a species of common-law mortgage.27 Their
preference for lien theory is therefore unfounded when the common-law mortgage is
redeemed. It is therefore time for a wholesale reconsideration of basic mortgage theory.
Third, the process of coming to a new understanding of the mortgage sounds another
cautionary note about unintended consequences ofjudges disregarding the stated terms
of parties' private agreements. In developing equitable mortgage doctrine, judges in
Chancery altered fundamental premises of contract law to disregard express language.
Private parties' response was to hide their intent behind explicit statements that they
did not mean in the hope of obtaining particular results. This generated a widely reviled
legal institution. Courts should therefore be wary of what will happen when they fail
to give effect to parties' clearly stated contract terms.
Finally, the analysis necessary to understand the mortgage contributes to legal
history. Not only do we understand the history of the mortgage itself better, but we
learn more of the much-neglected history of remedies and secured lending. Professor
D.J. Ibbetson recently wrote:
As legal historians, and as lawyers, we spend a good deal of time looking at
substantive law and at the forms of action; but we spend remarkably little time
looking at remedies. This is a curious imbalance, since for the litigants in any case
it is the remedy that normally matters.2
8
The substantive right beneath secured lending and execution of civil judgments is
obvious: the former is a debtor's pledge, and the latter is a court's judgment. The
remedy is the question for both. Yet little legal history exists for either. To understand
the common-law mortgage, the legal history of both is needed. And some of that
appears below.
This article proceeds in several parts. Part I explains the common-law mortgage in
light of the relevant legal context. It considers the mortgage from roughly 1580 to 1620,
when the common-law mortgage was both fully developed, and as yet unaffected by
equity.29 It sets out the prevailing legal structures that created a pervasive risk of
encumbrances to legal titles to land. It does this first by explaining how the writ of debt
and bonds operated as the basis of lending. It then shows how remedies for lenders
reached land. And next it explains how other forms of secured lending fit in that
framework to create a setting in which the mortgage made sense. It thus provides a
summary of remedies and secured lending historically, which incidentally shows how
the mortgage was arguably the peak of a hierarchy of securities for lenders.
Part II next considers the changes wrought by equity upon the common-law
mortgage. It shows how, in response to equity, parties hid the intent of their mortgage
contracts beneath forms of language not openly expressing their meaning. They aimed
to get a result from the Court of Chancery, not state what they meant. This disjunction
27 See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 209.
28 David Ibbetson, The Assessment of Contractual Damages at Common Law in the Late Sixteenth
Century, in LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS 126 (Matthew Dyson & David J. Ibbetson eds., 2013).
29 The period roughly 1580 to 1620 forms what the rest of this article refers to as "our period."
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constituted the supposed mendacity grounding criticisms of the mortgage. Part H thus
shows how criticisms of the common-law mortgage are really criticisms of the side
effects of equitable intervention.
Part III then reassesses the validity of the consensus that the common-law mortgage
is problematic. It considers in detail each criticism of the mortgage presented at the
beginning of this article. It shows that the pure common-law mortgage is undeserving
of the consensus view, while its post-equity successor may be.
Part IV then shows how, in the absence of the traditional criticism of the
common-law mortgage, the leading position on basic mortgage theory in America
needs reassessment. It shows that both the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages
and the leading treatise on mortgages, which have influenced the majority of states,
have an improperly supported preference for lien theory over both title and intermediate
theories. Part IV therefore concludes that a reassessment of basic mortgage theory is
needed.
I. THE COMMON-LAW MORTGAGE HISTORICALLY
The common-law mortgage cannot be understood in isolation. It must be set in the
contemporary context of its operation to understand how and why it had the form that
it did. This section considers debts and secured lending from roughly 1580 to 1620. It
explains the basic structures of the writ of debt, simple securities like bonds, advanced
securities like recognizances and statutes merchant and staple, and shows how all such
instruments found effect in remedies of the day. It then sets the common-law mortgage
in this context. In so doing it shows how the common-law mortgage was a logical
element of a coherent system, and, indeed, even arguably the peak of the hierarchy of
securities at that time.
A. The Writ ofDebt and Bonds
At common law all questions of credit and debt began with the well-known writ of
debt. It was the form of action by which to claim a sum certain owed.3 o Other actions,
such as covenant or assumpsit, also availed creditors; but the former was oriented
toward recovery of unliquidated damages," while the latter was to some extent still in
development, and was, in any case, primarily a means to recover unsecured debts.32
Debt actions came in two forms, sur contract or sur obligation. Debt sur contract was
available upon parol debts, while debt sur obligation required a sealed writing attesting
to a debt.33 Debt sur contract was therefore the form of action for unsecured creditors,
given it had at least two comparative disadvantages. First, the action died with a debtor,
leaving an unsecured creditor without recourse against a decedent's estate.34 Second, a
defendant in such an action could elect wager of law as the method of trial. 5 This meant
3o A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 61-70 (1975); see also J. H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 321 (4th ed. 2002); PLUCKNETP, supra note 6, at
362-63.
31 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 6, 13; see also D. J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF OBLIGATIONS 92 (1999). The vitality of covenant as a form of action after the medieval period has also
been questioned. SIMPSON, supra note 30, at I17; IBBETSON, supra note 31, at 30.
32 See BAKER, supra note 30, at 368.
33 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 136.
34 PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 647-48; SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 143.
35 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 137.
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the debtor could plead and swear nil debet (he/she owes nothing), and, upon swearing
eleven other "compurgators" or "oath helpers" to his or her honesty, favorable
judgment followed automatically.6 By the end of the sixteenth century, wager of law
was becoming a fiction: an officer of the court found compurgators on behalf of any
defendant.3 ' Debt sur contract was therefore not a particularly desirable action
compared with debt sur obligation.
The instrument enabling creditors to proceed in debt sur obligation was the basic
form of security: a sealed writing, called (largely interchangeably) a bond, specialty,
obligation, or, particularly when written in English and unconditional, a bill.38 Because
it was under seal, an obligation was a deed that ipso facto gave rise to a debt.39 Its basic
form was a statement that A owed B a certain sum.4o So identical with the debt was
this deed that losing the deed meant losing the action; a creditor could not sue debt sur
contract instead.4 1
Debt sur obligation was creditor friendly in several ways. Significantly, it did not
admit of wager of law.42 And it could be sued against a decedent's estate.43 It also
greatly eased a creditor's path to judgment by reducing the pleas available to a debtor.
Because a deed could be contradicted only by another deed, a debtor could not plead
payment without a sealed acquittance or defeasance." Instead a debtor might challenge
the validity of the deed itself by pleading non estfactum-that the bond in question
was someone else's bond, or not a bond at all, or was invalid due to incapacity such as
infancy.45 Relatedly, a debtor could plead that the bond had been tampered with after
sealing.46 Or a debtor could plead duress-that the debtor had been illegitimately
forced to make the bond.47 An illiterate debtor could plead that the terms of the bond
had been improperly explained, but such a claim was of course unavailable to anyone
who could read.48 None of these pleas were terribly likely to fit the facts actually arising
3 BAKER, supra note 30, at 74, 322-23; EDWARD COKE, I INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 295r
(London, 1628) [hereinafter Co. Lrrr.]; SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 137-38.
" BAKER, supra note 30, at 74.
38 SIMPsON, supra note 30, at 88; see also Obligation, JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER (1607); 1
WILLIAM WEST, SYMBOLEOGRAPHY § Ioo (London, 1615); T. F. T. Plucknett, Deeds and Seals, 32
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC'y 141, 149 (1950). Regarding "obligation" versus "bill," West
emphasizes that the former is in Latin and the latter in English: "A Bill or Obligation (which be all one,
sauing that when it is in English, it is commonly called a Bill, and when it is in Latin, an Obligation) is a
deed." WEST, supra. Sir Edward Coke said that the former was conditional and the latter single or simple:
"'Obligation,' is a word of his owne nature of a large extent, but it is commonly taken in the Common Law,
for a Bond containing a penaltie with condition for payment of money, or to do or suffer some act or thing,
&c. and a Bill is most commonly taken for a single Bond without condition." Co. LITr., supra note 36, at
172a. Cowell quotes the relevant portion of West but glosses it with the substance of Coke's definition: "True
it is that a Bill is obligatorie; but we commonly call that an obligation, which hath a condition annexed."
COWELL, supra.
39 PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 149.
4 See WEST, supra note 38, at § 102 (transcription on file).
4' SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 95-96; see also IBBETSON, supra note 31, at 20-21.
42 Co. Ltrr., supra note 36, at 295r; Plucknett, supra note 38, at 149.
43 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 82-84.
4 BAKER, supra note 30, at 324-25; SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 96, 99-loi.
45 BAKER, supra note 30, at 324.
4 Id.
4 Id.; SIMPSON, supra note 3o, at 98-99; see also IBBETSON, supra note 31, at 71-73, 208.
48 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 98-99.
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in the real world; they applied too narrowly. But essentially no other pleas could avoid
judgment for a creditor.49
Most bonds, however, did admit of a more substantial plea. These were conditional
bonds, a type of bond that stated A owed B a certain sum on its face, while providing
on the back that the bond was void if A did a certain act. For instance, a bond upon a
loan of £too typically stated that the debtor owed E200, while the condition on the back
rendered that obligation void upon payment of fioo by a certain time."o The sum of the
bond thus represented a penalty that, in the language of the time, became forfeit upon
failure to perform the condition. The condition represented what the debtor was really
meant to do. The borrower of £oo was really meant to repay the £ioo; if the borrower
failed, he or she owed £200. Because a condition was normally endorsed-written on
the back-the seal of the obligation did not apply to it." A debtor could therefore plead
and introduce parol evidence-such as performance-in relation to it.s2 Conditional
bonds thus often led to jury trial on the question of performance of the condition.53
Despite having to go through a jury trial on a conditional bond, it still helped a creditor
by eliminating the disadvantages of debt sur contract; this was the point of a bond as a
security.
Once a creditor obtained judgment in debt whether sur contract or sur obligation,
he or she was entitled to a threefold sum. First, and most obviously, the creditor was
entitled to the principal debt itself-the "sum certain" stated both in the bond and the
writ initiating the action.54 Second, the creditor was entitled to damages for the
detention of the principal debt.5 Third, the creditor was entitled to costs of litigation. 5 6
In short, judgment in debt yielded the sum due plus compensation for failing to pay.
B. Execution ofDamages Judgments
While the writ of debt and bonds have long been understood, remedies upon debt
judgments have not. As Professor Ibbetson suggested, this is strange: bonds and writs
are merely how a creditor obtains a court declaration of a right to a sum-a matter
completely preliminary to the actual recovery of value.57 Understanding remedies upon
debt judgments therefore matters per se as the root of legal credit relations, in addition
to its significance for the common-law mortgage. A judgment creditor could choose
between four writs of execution, two supplied by common law and two supplied by
statute, each of which gave a different remedy. It is worth noting these were the same
remedies for anyone with a money judgment irrespective of the original cause of action,
49 See BAKER, supra note 30, at 324-25. One can never eliminate the possibility that available pleas
might be used fictitiously simply to get the matter before a jury to allow them to do substantial justice
irrespective of law.
so Id. at 324; SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 90.
51 See BAKER, supra note 30, at 324.52 
d
53 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 101-02; see also BAKER, supra note 30, at 324. For more detail see Co.
LITT., supra note 36, at 207a.
54 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 61-62. The sums of the bond and writ had to be identical or the action was
invalid. See id.; S. F. C. Milsom, Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century, 77 L. Q. REV. 257, 257-58 (1961).
" lbbetson, supra note 28, at 128. In cases of jury trial, the jury assessed damages and costs, and the
court made an additional award of costs that seems to have incorporated awareness of what the jury had
awarded. Id. at 128-30.
16 Id. at 128.
" See id. at 126.
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whether sounding in what we would today classify as tort, contract, unjust enrichment,
or something else.18
i. Fieri Facias
The most basic remedy was the common-law writ offierifacias. It ordered a sheriff
to "make to happen" satisfaction of the sum of the judgment from sale of a judgment
debtor's goods and chattels.59 A sheriff would seize and sell enough property to raise
the relevant sum and then pay the money into court."o A sheriff could not simply deliver
the property to the creditor," nor keep it and deliver the money from his own funds; he
had to sell it.62
As to what a sheriff could seize, it was said by Justice Holt (Chief Justice of the
King's Bench 1689-1710) that "upon afierifacias the sheriff may take anything but
wearing clothes; nay if the party hath two gowns, he may take one of them." There is
no reason to believe that the same was not substantially true in our period (i.e. roughly
1580 to 1620).' Rent-charges qualified as saleable chattels under afierifaciass,
65 as did
leases;' although leases could also be treated as lands for purposes of execution.6 7
Whatever a debtor owned at the teste of the writ, that is the date that the writ issued,
were charged for sale,6 1 including any goods subsequently given away or sold bona
fide by the debtor; the logic was that the writ altered the goods' property, rendering the
debtor incapable of conveying good title." Bankruptcy of the debtor after execution of
a fieri facias, but before it was returned to court, did not alter this position.70 If a
debtor's chattels proved insufficient to make up the whole sum of a judgment, a creditor
could subsequently sue another process of execution. '
5 See Foster v. Jackson (1615) 8o Eng. Rep. 201, 2o6; Hob. 57.
59 Co. LrrT., supra note 36, at 290v.
' See Goodyere v. Ince (1610) 79 Eng. Rep. 2n1; Cro. Jac. 246; Anon. (1579) 73 Eng. Rep. 815; 3 Dy.
363a.
61 Thomson v. Clerk (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 754; Cro. Eliz. 754.
62 Waller v. Weedale (1604) 74 Eng. Rep. 1072; Noy 107.
63 Hardistey v. Barney (1696) 90 Eng. Rep. 525; Comb. Rep. 356.
64 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61 See York v. Twine (1605) 79 Eng. Rep. 67; Cro. Jac. Rep. 79; 145 Eng. Rep. 228; Jenk. 312 (per
Popham, C.J.K.B., Anderson, C.J.C.P., and Fleming, C.B.).
66 See Manning's Case (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 618, 623; 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 96b.
6' Fleetwood's Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 731; 8 Co. Rep. 171 a; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 391.
68 Parkes v. Mosse (1589) 78 Eng. Rep. 437; Cro. Eliz. 181 ("[F]or by the execution awarded, the goods
are bound.. . .").
69 See, e.g., Boucher v. Wiseman (1595) 78 Eng. Rep. 680, 681; Cro. Eliz. 44o, 44o (gift after teste
ineffective against execution); Wangford v. Sexton (1580) 74 Eng. Rep. 277; I Leo. 305 (bonafide sale after
teste ineffective against execution); Anon. (1590) 78 Eng. Rep. 431; Cro. Eliz. 174 (bonafide sale after teste
ineffective against execution); Fleetwood's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 731; 8 Co. Rep. at 171a ("and a sale [] bona
fide of chattels is good after judgment, but not I after execution awarded"); Wilson v. Wormal (16wo) 78
Eng. Rep. 98; Godb. 161 (holding sale of a lease after judgment but before execution was good);. Cf. Ayer
v. Aden (r604-05) 80 Eng. Rep. 32; Yel 45 (K.B). Contra Ayre v. Aden (1605) 79 Eng. Rep. 62; Cro. Jac. 73.
The Statute of Frauds 1677 later modified the rule because some creditors would take out successive writs of
execution to prevent debtors from being able sell their property while not actually delivering the writs to the
sheriff to be executed; the Statute of Frauds therefore provided that property was altered only in those goods
held on the date that the writ was actually delivered to the sheriff. See (1677) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 15.
o Benson v. Flower (1629) 79 Eng. Rep. 754; Cro. Car. 176.
' Foster v. Jackson, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 201, 2o7-o8; Hob. 52, 58-59; see also THE COMPLEAT
SOLICITOR 72-73 (1668); infra texting accompanying note 114.
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ii. Levari Facias
The second common-law writ of execution was levarifacias. It ordered a sheriff to
"do to levy" the sum of the judgment from both a debtor's chattels and the profits of
his or her land and deliver the sum raised directly to the creditor.72 Profits essentially
meant crops, rents, and beasts.73 Any beasts could be taken from a debtor's land if they
were "levant and couchant", that is, had been on the land long enough to have lain
down and stood up, normally a day and a night, at which point they were considered
fruit of the land.74 A debtor's lands were not to be delivered to a creditor upon a levari
facias except in the case of a suit against an heir upon an obligation of an ancestor, in
which case all the lands descended could be delivered to the creditor for the creditor to
take the profits directly."s The point of levarifacias was to seize the wealth generated
by land, a significant type of wealth in a pre-manufacturing era. It is nevertheless a
commonplace that levari facias fell largely into disuse after the creation of the third
writ of execution, elegit.76 It then became limited to pockets such as the writ, sometimes
considered categorically distinct, of levari facias de bonis ecclesiasticis against
clerics.7 7
iii. Elegit
The Statute of Westminster 11 (1285) created a third form of execution, called elegit,
by providing:
When Debt is recovered or knowledged in the King's Court, or Damages
awarded, it shall be from henceforth in the Election of him that sueth for such Debt
or Damages, [to have a Writ of Fieri facias unto the Sheriff for to levy the Debt] of
the Lands and Goods; or that the Sheriff shall deliver to him all the Chattels of the
Debtor, saving only his Oxen and Beasts of his Plough, and the one half of his
Land, until the Debt be levied upon a reasonable Price or Extent.78
The option provided in contrast tofierifacias became known as elegit because the
creditor had "elected" so to proceed.79 It provided a two-pronged execution against
both a debtor's goods and chattels (except oxen and beasts of the plough), and his or
her land.
The lesser aspect of elegit was seizure of goods and chattels. Such seizure differed
from fieri facias in two respects. First, oxen and beasts of the plough were excepted
72 See, e.g., Coke's Case (1623) 78 Eng. Rep. 169, 170-71; Godb. 289, 291-93; Foster v. Jackson (16io)
123 Eng. Rep. 960, 963; 2 Brownl. 311, 316; Harbert's Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 647,
654-55; 3 Co. Rep. it b, 12 a.
n See PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 390.
74 See Henry Clare's Case (16io) 145 Eng. Rep. 329; Lane. 97; Stafford v. Bateman (594) 78 Eng. Rep.
672; Cro. Eliz. 432; 75 Eng. Rep. to50, 1050-51; Gould. 140-41. Note that later law was that even those oxen
and beasts owned by a third party but levant and couchant on a debtor's land could be taken under a levari
facias. GILES JACOB & J. MORGAN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, (loth ed. 1782) (defining "Levant and
Couchant"); Britton v. Cole (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 342; t Salk. 395.
" Davy v. Pepys (1573) 75 Eng. Rep. 658, 662; 2 Pl. Com. 438, 441.
76 See Harbert's Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 647, 654 n.C; 3 Co. Rep. II b, 12 a.
n See id.
* Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. 18.
7 Co. LITr., supra note 36, at 289b.
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from seizure. As mentioned below, this cohered with what was provided in respect of
land. Second, rather than sold on the open market by a sheriff, chattels were appraised
by a jury of inquest in a process known as "extent" and delivered directly to the
creditor.80
The more important aspect of elegit was seizure and delivery to the creditor of a
moiety (that is half) of a debtor's lands for the creditor to levy profits. A creditor was
thus given something like a lease of a debtor's lands; although, unlike a lease, this
special tenure, called a "tenancy by elegit," was in some cases of uncertain duration.8 1
A debtor's lands were said to be "extended" because, just as with chattels, a jury
assessed the land's extent to determine what a creditor should take.82 The jury were to
measure the full extent of a debtor's lands though only a moiety would be delivered to
the creditor.83 The exception from seizure for beasts of the plough allowed a debtor to
continue productively to use his or her remaining moiety. If the jury overvalued the
lands, meaning that a creditor would not in fact be recompensed in reasonable time, a
creditor could do nothing about it; 84 this distinguished extent upon elegit from that upon
a statute merchant or staple, discussed below.85 If the jury undervalued the lands so that
a creditor recovered excess, the undervaluation did not affect the creditor's tenancy.86
Lands chargeable under elegit were those held at the time of judgment. Time of
judgment was deemed to mean either the date of trial at nisi prius, or the first day of
term, whichever was earlier.87 Lands alienated after judgment therefore remained
subject to execution.88 If, for instance, a debtor held Blackacre, Whiteacre, and
Greenacre at judgment, and later sold Blackacre and Whiteacre, the creditor, at his or
her election, could execute either upon the debtor's only remaining parcel, Greenacre,
or against all three parcels; the creditor could not pick and choose amongst the land in
the hands of alienees. As mentioned above, leases could either be treated as chattels
or extended as lands under elegit."0 If a creditor extended a reversion--i.e. if a debtor
o See Goodyere v. Ince (1610) 79 Eng. Rep. 211; Cro. Jac. 246; 123 Eng. Rep. 9o1; 2 Brownl. 209; cf sub
nom. Goodyer v. Junce, 8o Eng. Rep. ii9; Yel. 179, 179-80.
"i The basic length of tenure was set by the jury's assessment of value. But various events might extend
the tenure to ensure full satisfaction. See Corbet's Case (1599) 76 Eng. Rep. 1058, 1o59-61; 4 Co. Rep. 8t b,
81 b-83 a ("in the other cases of tenant by elegit, statute merchant, &c. and there is no term certain, but until
such a sum be by them levied, and there it stands with such interest, that in some case he may hold over.");
Co. LITT., supra note 36, at 42a ("And tenant by statute merchant, by statute staple, and by elegit, have
incertaine interests in lands or tenements, and yet they have but chattels, and no freehold, whose estates are
created by divers acts of parliament."). Whether tenancy by elegit or statute merchant or staple was of certain
duration was a point of considerable legal difficulty. See Christopher McNall, The Nature of the Tenancy by
Statute Merchant, 23 J. LEG. HIST. 37,39-41 (2oo2).
82 See Sparrow v. Mattersock (1633) 79 Eng. Rep. 878, 879; Cro. Car. 319,320; cf Garraway v. Harrington
(1620) 79 Eng. Rep. 487; Cro. Jac. 569; infra text accompanying note 168.
83 Sparrow, 79 Eng. Rep. at 878; Cro. Car. at 319.
" Anon. (1557) 73 Eng. Rep. 941 pl. 6o; Beni. 15 pl. 6o; Co. LITr., supra note 36, at 290a. But see
Molineux v. Lacon (1602) 79 Eng. Rep. iI; Cro. Jac. 12.
5 See infra text accompanying note 168.
6 See R. v. Wall (1591) 78 Eng. Rep. 521; Cro. EliZ. 266.
87 CO. LITT., supra note 36, at ioza.; I Rol. Abr. 891-92; Standford v. Cooper (1626) 79 Eng. Rep. 690;
Cro. Car. 1o2; Anon. (1557) 73 Eng. Rep. 324; 2 Dy. 149 a; see also Springall v. Tuttersbury (1629) 124 Eng.
Rep. 419; Het. 158; Walter v. Bould (161o) 8o Eng. Rep. 735, 736; 1 Bulst. 31, 32; Huys v. Wright (1603) 80
Eng. Rep. 26; Yel 35. The Statute of Frauds 1677 changed the time of judgment in respect of bona fide
purchasers for value who were henceforth bound only by the date that an officer of the court signed a
judgment, which date was entered in the margin of the judgment on the plea roll. (1677) 29 Car. II, c. 3, ss.
13-14.
8 2 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTrruTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 395-96 (6th ed. 1642).
89 Id.
" See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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were a lessor with right of re-entry upon termination of a lease-the debtor's lessee
would not be ousted, but would simply pay rent to the creditor instead of the debtor.9 1
If a moiety of a debtor's lands were already in extent upon elegit and another elegit
were sued, the second creditor received only a moiety of the remaining moiety, i.e., a
quarter of the original lands, and so on for further elegits.92 A debtor's copyhold lands
were not subject to elegit because the lord's interest in such lands was considered too
great to allow imposition of a new tenant by such a writ." Putting detail to one side, it
is important to emphasize how elegit rendered anyone's non-copyhold land subject to
execution upon any damages judgment. No matter how a debt arose, once recognized
in court, elegit let the judgment creditor reach the judgment debtor's land.
Selection of elegit theoretically prevented resort to other forms of execution
"because upon the prayer to have an elegit, it is entred[sic] in the roll, elegit sibi
executionem per medietatem terrae, so as he is estopped by the record to have another
execution."94 A similar logic restricted creditors to one type of execution at a time no
matter which was selected.95 But the limitation applied only so long as the execution
was still outstanding: if the record reflected completion of the execution without
satisfaction of the entire judgment, a creditor could sue alternate execution.9 6 For
instance, if a sheriff returned that a debtor had no property in his bailiwick (called a
nihil habet), a creditor could sue out other execution; he or she had received no
satisfaction.97 Similarly, if a sheriff returned that a debtor's goods and chattels were
insufficient to raise the judgment sum, and the debtor had no land in his bailiwick, an
elegit was treated as being in the nature of afierifacias, and alternate execution was
available just as upon an insufficientfierifacias.98 But if a sheriff returned an extent of
any lands, no matter how small in value, such extent constituted full satisfaction: the
creditor theoretically could hold for as long as necessary to levy the full judgment."
A tenant by elegit had a statutory right to defend his or her possession by an action
of novel disseisin.00 Such protection was useful against interference with the land that
qualified as the type of dispossession known as disseisin.'0 ' But before i54o, most
creditors dispossessed in a manner not constituting a disseisin had no remedy. If more
than a year and a day passed since judgment, which was probably true for most
creditors, the Statute of Westminster II required, for any execution, suing a scirefacias,
which called a judgment debtor into court to "make to know" why the judgment
"' See Day v. Austin (1595) 78 Eng. Rep. 642; Cro. Eliz. 398; The Bishop of Bristow's Case (1584) 74
Eng. Rep. 575; 3 Leo. 113.
92 See Huit v. Cogan, (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 734; Cro. Eliz. 483.
9 Rowden v. Maltster (1626) 79 Eng. Rep. 641, 642; Cro. Car 42, 43; Heydon's Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep.
637, 642; 123 Eng. Rep. 1016; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 9 a.
1 Cowley v. Legat (1613) 78 Eng. Rep. 150; Godb. 257; sub nom. Crawley v. Lidgeat, at 79 Eng. Rep.
288; Cro. Jac. 388; sub nom. Cowley v. Lydeot, at 80 Eng. Rep. 989; 2 Bulst. 97; sub nom. Cowley v. Lydiat,
81 Eng. Rep. 289; 1 Rolle 9; sub nom. Anon., 80 Eng. Rep. 152 pl. 3; Hob. 2; see infra 114 and accompanying
text.
9 See Foster v. Jackson (1615) 8o Eng. Rep. 201, 206-o8; Hob. 52, 57-59.
* Id
97 See id.; Palmer v. Knowllis (1589) 74 Eng. Rep. 162, 163; Leo. 176, 177, rev'd sub nom. Knowles v.
Palmer (1589) 78 Eng. Rep. 418, 418; Cro. Eliz. 161, 161.
98 See Foster, 80 Eng. Rep. at 207-08; Hob. at 58-59; see also THE COMPLEAT SOLICITOR, supra note
71, at 72-73
9 Cowley, 78 Eng. Rep. at 150; Godb. at 257; Palmer, 74 Eng. Rep. at t62; Leo. at 177; CO. LITT., supra
note 36, at 289b; cf Fulwood's Case (1591) 76 Eng. Rep. 1031, 1034-35; 4 Co. Rep. 64b, 66a-67a (discussing
remedies for a conusee).
i" Statute of Westminster 11 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. I8.
101 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 358-60.
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creditor should not have execution.102 A dispossessed tenant by elegit had no basis to
sue scirefacias because the record reflected a completed execution.'03 In 154o, "An Act
for Contentation[sic] of Debts upon Execution" made scirefacias available to tenants
by elegit.'" But scire facias was unavailable if a tenant by elegit lost only part
possession on the theory that he or she could make up the entire judgment by holding
over on the remaining portion of the land.os
Aside from such complications in defending possession, a tenancy by elegit had
other difficulties. A tenant by elegit was liable for waste to a debtor by writ of venire
facias adcomputandum.os And more prosaically, the tenant incurred the cost of raising
profits from the land. Actual possession would ordinarily be impractical. A tenant by
elegit might therefore sell the entire tenancy, as it was a chattel real-a form of
property-after execution (being a mere chose in action before).'07 The alterative
practice developed of leaving a debtor in possession of extended lands but extracting
periodic payments much like a rent.'
iv. Capias ad Satisfaciendum
The final form of execution was different-and more notorious-than the other
three. A writ of capias ad satisfaciendum ordered a sheriff to "seize until satisfaction"
the body of a debtor. Capias ad satisfaciendum was, in other words, the means of
sending someone to debtors' prison. At common law capias was available only in those
private actions involving breach of the King's peace," which did not include peaceful
actions like debt. But a statute of 1352 extended capias to actions of debt."0 Capias was
a unique form of execution in that it had no proprietary effect: it affected only the body
of a debtor, not his or her property. The debtor's body was taken as a "pledge" for
satisfaction;" as Justice Houghton of the King's Bench put it: "capias ad
satisfaciendum; is no satisfaction; the same is only ad satisfaciendum, but not in
satisfactione."12 Justice Dodderidge also of the King's Bench said: "a capias is a
begun execution, but not the fruit and effect of law"." 3 Despite its inconclusive effect,
a creditor could have no further process of execution once a debtor was in custody upon
capias.1"4 The logic was the same as for elegit:
102 Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. 45; Harbert's Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 647, 655; 3 Co.
Rep. ib, r2a; 2 COKE, supra note 89, at 469-72; JOHN RASTELL, Scire Facias, in TERMES DE LA LEY 283,
283 (London, 1624).
'o3 See Harbert's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 655; 3 Co. Rep. at i2a.
104 32 Hen. 8 c. 5; Co. LITr., supra note 36, at 289b-90b.
ios Fulwood's Case (59) 76 Eng. Rep. 1031, 1034; 4 Co. Rep. 64b, 66a.
"'0 RASTELL, Elegit, in TERMES DE LA LEY, supra note 1o2, at 165-66.
107 Id. at 167; see also Underhill v. Devereux (1663) 85 Eng. Rep. 698, 702-o3 n. i; Wms. Saund. 68, 68
(explaining a tenancy by elegit as a chattel interest).
los BAKER, supra note 30, at 66-67; see also Underhill 85 Eng. Rep. at 708 n. 1.
1" See Foster v. Jackson (t615) 80 Eng. Rep. 201, 2o6; Hob. 52, 57; Ognel v Paston (1589) 74 Eng. Rep.
377, 378-79; Leo. 84, 85-86.
1o 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 17; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 389; SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 87, 588-89; cf
BAKER, supra note 30, at 64 & n.62.
." Crawley v. Lidgeat (1613) 79 Eng. Rep. 288, 289; Cro. Jac. 338, 339; see cases cited supra note 94.
112 Cowleya v. Lydeot (1613) 80 Eng. Rep. 989; Bulst. 97.
"3 Id. at 992; see cases cited supra note 94.
" Foster, 80 Eng. Rep. at 209; Hob. at 60 ("[Tlhe capias executed, and the body taken, stops, as against
him all other executions but itself, and the consequence of it, which is the action of debt, or action upon the
case upon the escape."); see cases cited supra note 94.
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[I]mplied in taking the capias ad satisfaciendum is an election of that for his
execution, now election implies rejection of the rest ....
For where the law gives three or four kinds of executions, not all together, but
by way of choice, whereof the capias ad satisfaciend[um] is one; and when the
body is taken, it is a full execution, and cannot be for part (as afierifac[ias] may
be) it is an election of it selffsic] of that kind of execution, and so a renouncing of
the rest as well as an elegit, though it use not the very word .... For if the defendant
had lands and goods, when the plaintiff took the body; he made a plain preferment
of that execution before the other. And if they came after, he prevented his choice
by haste, which expedition alone is a great advantage in execution."s
A consequence of such logic was that, for most of our period, the better opinion
held that the death of a debtor in custody upon capias ad satisfaciendum discharged
the debt. The creditor had elected his or her execution in taking the body, and it had
succeeded; further execution was unavailable."' Coke's opinion was contrary, and one
of his reports claimed that law was with him."' But both Lord Chancellor Ellesmere
and Justice Hutton of the Common Pleas explicitly noted that Coke misrepresented the
law in his report."' A statute of 1623 declared that the issue had been "much doubted
and questioned"."' It recited that various debtors had "obstinately and wilfully chosen
rather to live and die in prison, than to make any satisfaction according to' their
abilities," because of discharge.120 1 The statute specifically allowed new process of
execution to issue against property of a debtor who had died in custody.121
In a similar vein, escape of a debtor in custody upon capias ad satisfaciendum
effectively worked a discharge: the record reflected satisfaction through the writ and
the sheriff's return that he had the debtor. In such a case, a creditor had to proceed
against the sheriff for allowing the escape.12 2 The Tie was not all bad for creditors as a
sheriff, usually a substantial member of the provincial gentry, might very well be worth
more than an imprisoned debtor. But by the end of our period the rule was changed so
that a creditor could proceed against either a sheriff or an escaped debtor, as later
opinion recognized that allowing an escaped debtor to avoid further execution
improperly rewarded the escape.123
"5 Foster, 8o Eng. Rep. at 206, 2o8; Hob. at 57, 59.
116 Id.; Williams v. Cutteris (1601) 79 Eng. Rep. 18, 119; Cro. Jac. 136, 137; cf Shaw v. Cutteris (r599)
78 Eng. Rep. 1076; Cro. Eliz. 851 (addressing debtor dying in gaol on a capias utlegatum rather than a capias
ad satisfaciendum); cf Linacre v. Rhode (1589) 74 Eng. Rep. 387, 388; Leo. 96, 97 (addressing death of a
debtor in gaol on a statute).
'" Blumfield's Case (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 185, 186; 5 Co. Rep. 86a, 87a.
is Cave v. Fleetwood (1629) 124 Eng. Rep. 42o; Het. 159; Thomas Egerton, The Lord Chancellor
Egertons Observacions vpon ye Lord Cookes Reportes, in LOUIS A. KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN
JACOBEAN ENGLAND 297, 313-14 (1977).
1" An Act for the relief of Creditors against such persons as die in Execution 1623, 21 Jac. I, c. 24.
1
20 
Id.
121 id
122 Sheriff of Essex's Case (ca. 1613-25) 8o Eng. Rep. 349; Hob. 203; Linacre v. Rhode (1589) 74 Eng.
Rep. 387, 388; Leo. 96, 97 (noting a difference between capias ad satisfaciendum and debtor apprehended
on a statute); cf Foster v. Jackson (1615) 8o Eng. Rep. 201, 2o6; Hob. 52, 57. A creditor had to proceed against
the sheriff even if capias were improperly awarded by the court. Bushe's Case (1590) 78 Eng. Rep. 444; Cro.
Eliz. 188; cf case cited infra note 147. A sheriff's liability had origins in the Statute of Westminster II's
provision that he should answer the debt of any prisoner held upon a writ of account but released. SIMPSON,
supra note 30, at 74-75. The Statute of Merchants 1285, passed the same year as Westminster II, also made
sheriffs and gaolers liable for escapes of prisoners on statutes merchant. 13 Edw. I. st. 3 ("And let the Keeper
of the Prison take heed, that he must answer for the Body or for the Debt."); see also infra notes 158-187 and
accompanying text.
123 Mounson v. Cleyton (1630) 79 Eng. Rep. 8io; Cro. Car. 240.
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The point of capias was to work a kind of state-sanctioned extortion. It held a debtor
to ransom from family, friends, and perhaps business networks. Professor Craig
Muldrew has richly described the economy in our period as an interpersonal affair in
which many local households mutually depended upon one another with much
admixture of social and economic realities.2 4 Imprisoning a debtor thus deeply affected
many relationships, not only social but also economic. Such affects rippled to more
distant degrees like disturbance of any networks. Capias distressed a debtor's entire
socio-economic network, both socially, by exploiting the human pathos of imprisoning
a loved one, and economically, by depriving it of a participant. In early-modem
England's world of social credit, one effect intensified the other. It was exactly such
distress that made capias work.
But just those factors that made capias effective made it dangerous. Imprisoning a
debtor was arguably a necessarily uncharitable course. One anonymous author wrote
as much, and more, in a polemic against debtors' prison published in 1641.125 He wrote
that either the debtor had assets, in which case it was more reasonable to take them
rather than precious liberty; or the debtor had none, in which case capias represented
an indefinite sentence.12 6 Extortion of third parties was the only possible object of such
execution:
Some have not to pay principall forfaiture or interest, and the Creditor knoweth
or beleeveth it: yet because the Prisoner hath some able kinsman or friend, he will
keep him miserably in Prisen io or 20 years, to try conclusions. And they are no
small numbers that are case into, and now lye in Prison upon this project, who live
and dye miserably for their able friends sake.127
A creditor might not like to risk appearing the heartless scrooge, with consequent cost
to the creditor's own credit, by use of such execution. An interesting question therefore
arises about the frequency and conditions in which creditor resorted to capias ad
satisfaciendum. In certain times and places, especially during economic downturns,
imprisoning debtors may have assumed a degree of normality.128 But otherwise one
gets the impression that capias might be called a "nuclear option", and was not a first
resort of creditors.
v. The Role of the Sheriff
It is worth noting the significance of the sheriff to all the forms of execution of civil
judgments described above. All writs required proper action by a sheriff. Sometimes
the law put substantive limitations upon what a sheriff could do. In executing afieri
facias, for instance, a sheriff was not allowed to break into a primary residence in search
124 CRAIG MULDREW, THE ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION: THE CULTURE OF CREDIT AND SOCIAL
RELATIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 95 157 (1998); see also D.P. Waddilove, Why the Equity of
Redemption?, in LAND AND CREDIT: MORTGAGES AND ANNUITIES IN THE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRYSIDE 117, 132-33 (C. Briggs & J. Zuijderduijn eds., 2018).
125 IMPRISONMENT OF MENS BODYES FOR DEBT (1641).
12 6 id.
127 Id. at 13.
128 See CHRISTOPHER W. BROOKS, LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 321
(2008); see also JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOLUME VI 1483-1558,
383-84 (2oo3) (implying that capias ad satisfaciendum was routine, but Professor Baker told this author in
conversation that he meant only to indicate the legal regularity of the writ rather comment on its social
standing or frequency of use).
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of chattels: Coke reported that it was said that "the house of every one is to him
as [] his castle and fortress," and thus protected from such intrusion.129 But if a sheriff
improperly broke down a door to a primary residence, the execution remained valid
and the sheriff became liable to the debtor in trespass.130 If a sheriff gained access to a
primary residence because the door was open, he could enter, and, moreover, was then
under a duty to break interior doors into other chambers as well as chests to recover
chattels.'31 Outbuildings were not protected against intrusion like a primary
residence.'32
Ensuring proper conduct of a sheriff was essentially a matter of private law. An
affected party had to take legal action as he or she may. So, as mentioned, a debtor
subject to improper execution of a fieri facias had to sue a sheriff in trespass.
Sometimes appropriate action was administrative, such as when a creditor would sue
out a writ of venditioni exponas, which ordered a sheriff to sell any goods seized under
a writ but not yet sold."' Often it was judicial, such as when a creditor would sue a
sheriff in debt. Debt would lie against a sheriff where, for instance, he raised money
but never paid it over; the logic in such a case was that a debtor was discharged by
surrender of property to a sheriff and the latter then owed the value to the creditor.' 34
A sheriff was, as mentioned above, similarly liable to a creditor in debt if he culpably
allowed a defendant in an action of debt to escape."' Indeed, relatively complicated
law developed regarding when sheriffs became indebted to judgment creditors. in the
course of their duties."' But sheriffs were personally unlikely to be the cause of any
difficulty: it was bailiffs, the sheriff's underlings, who were more likely tocause
trouble. As one of Coke's reports put it, "although the sheriff be an officer of great
authority and trust, yet it appears by experience, that the King's writs are served by
bailiffs, persons of little or no value."'37 Another report describes some questionable
bailiffs as "gaol-birds."'3 8 Such were the problems with bailiffs that the doctrine of
respondeat superior originated in a statute relating to bailiffs and sheriffs.'3 9 Affected
parties thus bore responsibility for oversight of a sheriff's execution through the
ordinary mechanisms of civil administration and litigation.
C. Methods ofSecured Lending beyond Bonds
Beyond bonds were several main methods of secured lending. They all operated in
concert with the scheme of execution outlined above, ensuring creditors could reach
i" Semayne's Case (16o4) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b; cf Seyman v. Gresham, (argued
inconclusively 1602; adjudged 1604) 78 Eng. Rep. 1131 Cro. Eliz. 909 (per curiam); Semayne v. Gresham
(1602) 8o Eng. Rep. 21 Yelverton, 29; see also BROOKS, supra note 128, at 357.
"o Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 194, 198; 5 Co. Rep. at 91a, 93a.
.3. Anon. (1602) 123 Eng. Rep. 658; I Brownl. 50.
132 Penton v. Browne, (1664) 82 Eng. Rep. 1047; 1 Sid. 186.
133 See "Venditioni exponas" in COWELL, supra note 38. Perhaps a better example is the writ of levari
facias quando vicomes returnavit quod non habuit emptores: "a writ commanding the Sheriffe to sell the
goods of the debtor, which hee hath already taken, and returned that he could not sell them, and as much
more of the debtors goods, as will satisfie the whole debt." Id.
"' Speake v. Richards (1617) 80 Eng. Rep. 353; Hob., 207.
13s See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., Parkinson v. Gilford (1639) 79 Eng. Rep. To64, 1065; Cro. Car. 539, 54o; Sly v. Finch (r618) 79 Eng.
Rep. 439, 44o; Cro. Jac. 5t4, 515; 78 Eng. Rep. 161; Godb. 276; Speake, 80 Eng. Rep. at 353; Hob., 207.
1' See Semayne's Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198; 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 93a.
138 Waterhouse v. Saltmarsh (1619) 8o Eng. Rep. 4o9, 4o9; Hob. 264, 264.
139 PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 475.
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particular property. As will be seen, these methods of secured lending fit into a rough
hierarchy of increasing security for creditors with the mortgage arguably at the peak.
i. Recognizances
i. Plain Recognizances
A recognizance was a security that combined elements of a bond and an action of
debt. Like a bond, a recognizance was a sealed writing attesting to a debt.140 Like an
action of debt, a recognizance involved a judgment recorded in court.14' A
recognizance was made when a debtor recognized, or in contemporary parlance
"knowledged", a debt in court.'42 Such a debtor was consequently called a "cognizor",
often modified to "conusor", and the corresponding creditor a "cognizee" or "conusee".
Acknowledgement of the debt was enrolled in the court's record and constituted a
judgment.43 A creditor took a sealed writing reflecting the enrollment. Recognizances
had begun as collusive debt actions,'" but had developed into a distinct entity.
A recognizance was even better security than a bond, but not because it had a
distinct form of execution. Execution upon a plain recognizance was essentially the
same as upon an ordinary debt judgment. The words of Westminster II relating tofieri
facias and elegit applied "when Debt is recovered or knowledged in the King's
Court".145 Levari facias was also available upon recognizances by common law.146
Capias was a different matter. There was a serious question whether capias was
available upon a recognizance in Chancery.'47 If a conusee waived the advantages of
the recognizance by simply treating it as a bond upon which to sue in debt (which could
be done before or after a year), capias was definitely available; otherwise there was
uncertainty.148 But irrespective of legal theory, common practice in Chancery was to
issue writs of capias upon recognizances in our period.'49 All of the remedies available
upon debt judgments were therefore available de facto upon recognizances in our
period, if not dejure.
What made a recognizance better security than a bond was that, while a bond eased
a creditor's path to judgment, a recognizance already was a judgment.so This gave
recognizances two major advantages.
140 See SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 126-27.
141 id
142 id
143 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 203-04; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 391-92.
1" See SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 126.
145 Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw.i, c. t8 (emphasis added).
'" See Hall v. Winckfeild (1616) 123 Eng. Rep. 671; 1 Brownl.. 69. The question arose at least where the
conusee had proceeded, as was usually necessary, upon a scirefacias. See infra note 152 and accompanying
text.
147 Weaver v. Clifford (1613) 80 Eng. Rep. 960, 962; 2 Bulst., 62, 65; 8o Eng. Rep. 30; Yel., 41; 79 Eng.
Rep. 2, 3; Cro. Jac. 3, 4; Ognell v. Paston (1589) 78 Eng. Rep. 422, 423; Cro. Eliz. 165, 166; sub nom. Ugnoll
v. Paston, 72 Eng. Rep. 576, 577; Moore, 273, 275; sub nom. Ognel v. Paston, 74 Eng. Rep. 377, 381; 2 Leo.,
84, 88; Paine v. Puttenham (1570) 73 Eng. Rep. 69o, 691; 3 Dy., 3o6a, 306b.
'4 Paine, 73 Eng. Rep. at 691; 3 Dy., at 3o6b.
149 See, e.g., Harris v. Colliton (1658) 145 Eng. Rep. 411, 412; Hardres 121, 123 ("There are a thousand
presidents for a capias upon a recognizance in Chancery; but a thousand more cannot make it to be law."
(per Finch for the defendant)); The Earl of Oxford's Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 488; 1 Chan. Rep. 13;
Weaver, 79 Eng. Rep. at 2, 3; Cro. Jac. at 2, 4.
1so See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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First, a conusee had a superior procedural posture. Because they had judgment some
conusees could proceed straight to execution; that put the burden of litigating the
validity of a recognizance debt on the conusor who had to sue a writ of audita
querela."' In many cases, however, conusees till bore the burden of litigation. Many
loans lasted for a year, and judgment was technically obtained upon acknowledgment
of a recognizance. Conusees consequently often fell within the requirement of the
Statute of Westminster II to sue a scire facias for execution upon any judgment
obtained more than a year previously.152 But under scirefacias conusees still had the
benefit that the burden of proof regarding why a creditor should not have execution fall
on the debtor. 1 3
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a recognizance charged a conusor's land
for purposes of execution from the date of acknowledgement.'54 A conusee still reached
land by elegit like any other creditor, but because elegit charged land from the date of
judgment,' and because a recognizance was a judgment from the date of
acknowledgment,'56 a conusee knew exactly which lands he or she could reach-from
day one. A conusee thus had greater security than a bond creditor.
2. Statutes
Parliament created special forms of recognizance by statute, which were therefore
themselves commonly called "statutes." They came in two varieties: statutes merchant
and statutes staple.I 7 The Statute of Acton Burnell (1283), amended two years later in
light of experience by the Statute Merchant (1285), established statutes merchant.'5 "
The Ordinance of the Staples (1353) established statutes staple.'59 As recognizances,
statutes had all their benefits. But as special instruments, they had certain further
advantages-most importantly, a particularly creditor-friendly form of execution.
I. Statutes Merchant
Statutes merchant were acknowledged "before the Mayor of London, or before
some Warden of a City or of another good Town, where the King shall appoint," or
before merchants appointed for the same function in fairs, or those deputized by any of
the aforesaid." Officials recorded the debt on two rolls, and gave an exemplification
1s1 PLUCKNETr, supra note 6, at 393-94; see also T. F. T. PLUCKNETr, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I
145- 46 (1949)-
152 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Coke's opinion was that Westminster II required scire
facias not a year after acknowledgment but only after the date upon which the debt was due; yet he also
seemed to recognize that this was not the law. COKE, supra note 89, at 470.
153 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
" Hall v. Winckfeild (1616) 8o Eng. Rep. 342, 343; Hob., 195, 196; 123 Eng. Rep. 671; I Brownl. 69.
Recognizances bound lands from the date of acknowledgment even if enrolment was later. The Statute of
Frauds 1677 changed this so that lands were bound only from the date of enrolment on the rationale that only
from that date did the public have notice of the charge. See (1677) 29 Car. II, c. 3, s. I7.
"5 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
1" See PLUCKNET, supra note 6, at 392-93.
"' Statute of Acton Burnell 1283, II Edw. I; The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13 Edw. 1, st. 3. The two
statutes together are sometimes called the "statutes merchant." SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 126-27.
"' The Ordinance of the Staples 1353, 27 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 9.
16' The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13 Edw. I, st. 3. In practice, clerks deputized to take statutes merchant
came to dominate their administration. A later statute provided: "That every Clerk which shall be deputed to
receive Recognizances in Cities and Boroughs, according to the Statute Merchant, shall abide in proper
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to the creditor sealed with special seals.'' The fee for a statute merchant was one penny
per pound sterling of obligation if acknowledged in a town, or one penny halfpenny if
acknowledged in a fair.'6 2 A statute of 1584 required that, in order to remain valid
against a bonafide purchaser of charged land, any statute of whatever nature had to be
certified to the Clerk of the Recognizances in Chancery within four months of
acknowledgement, and the clerk actually had to enroll it within six months.'63 If the
formalities of making a statute merchant failed, the deed might still qualify as a bond."
Although originally designed for use by foreign merchants, statutes merchant came to
be widely used even by non-merchants.6 1
The key advantage of statutes was their pro-creditor form of execution. Such
execution was severe enough that the Statute of Merchants itself required explanation
to a debtor "so that after he cannot say, that any did put another Penalty than that
whereto he bound himself."'6 6 A statute gave a conusee the same advantageous
procedural posture as upon a plain recognizance. But execution upon a statute had two
other, major advantages over a plain recognizance.
First, a statute conusee could proceed concurrently against a debtor's chattels,
lands, and body.66 Every other form of execution required choices. Fierifacias was a
choice for goods and chattels instead of land or body. Elegit was a choice for
property-both realty (land) and personalty (goods and chattels)-instead of the body.
Capias adsatisfaciendum was a choice for only a debtor's body instead of property. A
statute allowed a creditor to have it all. No other form of security allowed concurrent
process against a debtor's person and property.
Second, a statute allowed a conusee to seize all of a debtor's lands, not merely a
moiety as under elegit.'6  The significance of reaching twice as much land for security
is self-explanatory. The process of such seizure was extent just like that under elegit
Person to do his Office, according as is contained in the Statute of Acton Burnel; and that he have Lands
sufficient in the same County, whereof be may answer to all Persons if he offend; if any other be in the same
Office, he shall be removed, and another convenient set in his Place." 134o, 14 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. H.
"' SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 127.
162 Statute Merchant 1285, 13 Edw. 1, st. 3.
163 Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances 1584, 27 Eliz. I, c. 4, §§ 5-7 (made perpetual 39 Eliz. I, c. i8).
Recognizances in the nature of a statute staple, discussed below, had been required to be enrolled since their
creation in 1532. 23 Hen. 8, c. 6; see also infra note 197 and accompanying text
i6 Ascue v. Hollingworth (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 744, 745; Cro. Eliz. 494,495; 78 Eng. Rep. 791; Cro. Eliz.
545; Fulshaw v. Ascue (1594) 78 Eng. Rep. 569; Cro. Eliz. 320; cf Bothomley v. Lord Fairfax (1717) 23 Eng.
Rep. 1090, 1091; 2. Vern. 749, 751 (comparing statutes merchant and plain recognizances). The same was not
true of a statute staple. A. W. B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82 L. Q. Rev. 392,
394 n.8 (1966), reprinted in A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 111, 113 n.8 (1987).
165 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 151, at r36-42; Christopher McNall, The Business of Statutory Debt
Registries, 1283-1307, in CREDIT AND DEBT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND C.II8o-C.1350 77-78 (P.R. Schofield &
N.J. Mayhew eds., 2002); but cf SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 127; WILLIAMS, supra note lo8, at 708-o9.
'6 The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13 Edw. I.; see also SIMPSON, supra note
30, at 127.
161 See notes 94, 115 and accompanying text.
16' The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13 Edw. 1. Professor Plucknett wrote that a statute conusee "could
reach [a debtor's] land by the writ of elegit." PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 608. This is probably technically
true because once the statute was certified into Chancery, it was a recognizance that ought to yield process,
including elegit, like any other recognizance. But no sensible statute conusee would use elegit. The distinct
statutory mechanism of execution upon statutes had every benefit of elegit, plus allowed execution upon
twice as much land, and had not offsetting detriments. Professor Plucknett's link between statutes and elegit
is therefore unlikely to reflect actual practice. Elsewhere, Professor Plucknett seemed to avoid such
confusion. Id. at 393. Another scholar put it, perhaps slightly exaggeratedly: "This interest taken by the
[statute] creditor, exclusively a creature of statute, was known as the 'tenancy by statute merchant."'
Christopher McNall, The Nature of the Tenancy by Statute Merchant, 23 J. LEG. HIST. 37, 37-38 (2002).
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with one exception: oxen and beasts of the plough had no exemption from seizure
because, unlike under elegit, the debtor retained no moiety of land upon which to use
them.'6 9 A statute conusee could also seize and sell-not just seize for a term-a
debtor's burgage tenements (i.e., land within a town).'
A statute, just like a plain recognizance, charged a debtor's land from the date of
acknowledgement.'7 1 A statute conusee therefore had certainty as to what lands he or
she could reach. A statute also allowed seizure of personalty, although there was some
risk that another creditor might reach it first; at least one contemporary report noted
that land was one thing but it was "otherwise in case of goods, for therein first come
first served."172
Once apprehended, a conusor had a three-month grace period during which to make
satisfaction as he or she chose, but was held in prison during that time at his or her own
cost.7 1 After the grace period, process issued against the debtor's property, and the
creditor had to provide the imprisoned debtor bread and water.174 The officials charged
with execution were those of the market town where the statute was acknowledged if a
conusor were within their jurisdiction."' If a conusor were elsewhere, town officials
certified the debt into the Chancery for execution by a sheriff.'7 First process to a
sheriff was a writ of capias si laicus to apprehend the debtor if a layman."'7 If a sheriff
returned that he could not find a conusor (non est inventus) or that such debtor was dead
(mortuus est), the creditor could move straight to execution upon the debtor's
property.'78
Execution upon a statute had several other, minor benefits. First, extent under a
statute, unlike elegit, also gave a creditor a remedy if the jury of inquest over-valued
the property so that the tenancy would not yield the full debt.179 The Statute of Acton
Burnell provided: "[F]or if they do set an over high Price ... then shall the Thing so
praised be delivered unto themselves at such Price as they have limited, and they shall
be forthwith answerable unto the Creditor for his Debt."' If the creditor accepted
overvalued lands, however, he was bound by his choice."' Such a rule created an
unambiguous incentive for jurors to undervalue property lest they be forced to take it
on disadvantageous terms; but whether this in practice resulted in the bias that one
might expect is unknown. What is known is that Lord Chancellor Ellesmere resisted
assisting debtors in Chancery whose lands had been undervalued: he was reported to
19 See supra Section o; see also McNall, supra note 168, at 37-38 (explaining that if a shortfall remained
after delivery of a debtor's chattels to a creditor, all the debtors lands were to be delivered to the creditor).
17 Statute of Acton Burnell 1283, IT Edw. 1; PLUCKNETT, supra note 151, at 138.17'See JACOB & MORGAN, supra note 74, (defining "Statute Merchant").
172 Anon. (between 1569-1625) 123 Eng. Rep. 650; I Brownl. 38. For the date of reports in Brownlow &
Goldsborough, see 5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 360 (1925).
173 The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13 Edw. I
174 Id,
176 Statute of Acton Burnell 1283, IT Edw. i.; The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13
Edw. I.
177 ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM OF THE MOST REVEREND JUDGE MR.
ANTHONY FITZ-HERBERT I3or-v (9th ed. 1794). Writs to a bishop, e.g., a writ still extant in the twenty-first
century, the fierifacias de bonis ecclesiasticis, issued against a beneficed cleric.
17' The Statute of Merchants 1285, 13 Edw. .
179 See supra note 84-85 and accompanying text.
..o Statute of Acton Burnell 1283, II Edw..; see also Whitton v. Weston (1628) 82 Eng. Rep. 96, Too;
Jones, W. 181, 188; Partridge v. Strange (1552) 75 Eng. Rep. 123, 131; 1 Pl. Com- 78, 83; CO. LITT., supra note
36, at 290r.
18' Foster v. Jackson (16io) 123 Eng. Rep. 960, 963; 2 Brownl. 311, 316 (per Warburton, J.).
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have said "that no remedy is to be given in Chancery, for extending over low, except
there be fraud or practise."'18 2 One imagines adequate remedy at law existed for such
debtors by writ of account or debt. Second, a statute conusee could recover extra
damages for expenses in holding lands by extent, which was not available upon
elegit.'" Such damages were not pre-determined, and the conusor had the burden of
suing a scirefacias to show that they had been satisfied."' Third, statutes also made
execution against the body of a Lord of Parliament available, which was not necessarily
the case upon an ordinary debt judgment.' Finally, although a statute conusor
remained in prison until a debt was satisfied,' because xecution was against the body
and property concurrently, even before the statute of 1623, the death of a statute conusor
in prison did not discharge the debt;' property remained an object of execution after
death just as it had been before.
Overall, execution upon a statute was uniquely extreme: it allowed both
imprisonment of a debtor and seizure of land and personal property. The only thing a
debtor retained was not even his or her freedom. But, in an important exception to total
asset stripping, a debtor retained a remainder in his or her lands after satisfaction of the
debt. That is to say, a statute conusor got his or her lands back when the debt was
satisfied, just like upon termination of a lease. But until satisfaction, a statute conusor
lost all present possessory right in his or her property and remained imprisoned.
II. Statutes Staple
Statutes staple were nearly the same as statutes merchant. Not designed for every
type of merchant, they were originally for merchants of staple goods, meaning at least
"Wools, Leather, Woolfels [i.e. woolskins], and Lead",'8 and possibly other basic
items such as cloth and tin.'8 The special markets in which these goods were traded
were also called staples.'" Statutes staple were acknowledged before the Mayor of a
staple and at least one of its two constables.'91 They were cheaper than statutes
merchant, costing only a halfpenny per pound under one-hundred pounds and only a
farthing per pound for sums thereabove.'92 It was said that the creditor at least must be
a merchant of the staple, and a good argument existed that both parties had to be
staplers.'93 But in practice members of the general public came to use statutes taple as
well.194 A statute of 1532, which declared retrospectively that statutes merchant were
permitted only "betwixte m[er]chaunt and m[er]chaunt of the same Stapull", provided
that staple officials taking acknowledgment of statutes with a non-stapler party were
182 Ossley's Case (1604) 21 Eng. Rep. 74; Choyce Cases 12r; contra Cockes v. Wheler (21 June 1592)
PRO C3 3/8 4, f. 716v. (transcription on file).
'" Fulwood's Case (1591) 76 Eng. Rep. 1031, 1036; 4 Co. Rep. 64 b, 67 b.
1
9
4 Id.
185 See Harris v. Lord Mountjoy (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 453, 453-54; 2 Leo. 173, 173-74.186
PLUCKNETT, supra note 165, at 141.
187 21 Jac. I, c. 24; Linacre v. Rhode (1589) 74 Eng. Rep. 387; 2 Leo. 95.
188 The Ordinance of the Staples 1353, 27 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. I.
"9 See, e.g., Staple, JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER (1607).
19o The Ordinance of the Staples 1353, 27 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. I. Staples were located in at least Newcastle
upon Tyne, York, Lincoln, Norwich, Westminster, Canterbury, Chichester, Winchester, Exeter, and Bristol;
for Wales, at Carmarthen; and for Ireland at Dublin, Waterford, Cork, and Droghda. Id
191 Id. at c. 9.
192 Id.
'9 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 129; WILLIAMS, supra note io8, at 709.
194 SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 129.
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liable to the considerable fine of £4o.'5 The same statute also created a new type of
statute for the population at large, practically identical to a regular statute staple, and
cumbersomely known as a "recognizance in the nature of a statute staple."'96
Recognizances in the nature of a statute staple differed only slightly from regular
statutes staple, and then only in form of creation. Instead of being acknowledged before
officials of a staple, these recognizances were acknowledged during term before the
chief justice of the King's Bench or Common Pleas, or in the vacation before both the
mayor of the staple of Westminster and the recorder of London.'9 Such rules had the
practical effect of restricting these instruments to London; all relevant officials had to
be in London during their respective periods of authority to take acknowledgement.
The statute of 1532 even went so far as to provide that clerks who enrolled such
recognizances were to be "dwelling or abiding in the said Citie of London" under
penalty of the also considerable fine of Lio for an absence of two days."' Enrollment
was duplicate, on one roll for the major official before whom it was acknowledged and
the other roll for the clerk' 99 From the time of their establishment in 1532,
recognizances in the nature of a statute staple had to be certified into Chancery within
four months and enrolled within six months to remain valid, the same requirement
imposed on statutes merchant and ordinary statutes staple in 1584.200 The cost of a
recognizance in the nature of a statute staple was a flat fee of 3 shillings 4 pence to the
major official(s) before whom it was acknowledged, the same again to the clerk: and
20 pence to a certify the statute to the Chancery.201 The statute itself was to be sealed
with the seal of the debtor, the king, and the official(s) before whom it was
acknowledged. Execution upon a recognizance in the nature of a statute staple was
identical to that upon a regular statute staple.
Other than in the details of their creation, statutes staple (including recognizances
in the nature of a statute staple) differed from statutes merchant only in one meaningful
way. Upon a statute staple: "the debtor [shall] have no advantage of the Quarter of a
Year which is contained in the said Statute-merchant".202 In other words, a debtor had
no three-month grace period during which a creditor could not seize his or her property.
First process of execution upon a statute staple was therefore a writ of capias et extendi
facias to take a debtor's body, chattels, and lands, all immediately.203 There was no
quarter for staple debtors.
Two other, insignificant differences also existed between execution upon statutes
merchant and staple. First, upon a statute staple a sheriff might elect to sell a debtor's
goods and deliver the value instead of delivering the goods themselves to the
creditor.2 04 Second, to obtain delivery of a debtor's chattels and lands after eturn of
the extent, a statute-staple conusee had to sue a writ of liberate to the sheriff 205 the
195 23 Hen. 8, c. 6.
196 SIMPsON, supra note 30, at 129.
197 id
19 Id
199 Id
200 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
201 23 Hen. 8, c. 6.
202 The Ordinance of the Staples 1353, 27 Edw. 3, St. 2, C. 9.
203 See Foster v. Jackson (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 201, 209; Hob. 52, 60; Linacre v. Rhode (1588) 74 Eng. Rep.
387, 388 (C.P.); 2 Leo. 95, 97; Anon. (0519) 145 Eng. Rep. 105 case X; Jenk. 163; WILLIAMS, supra note 1o8,
at 711.
204 The Ordinance of the Staples 1353, 27 Edw. 3, St. 2, C. 9.
205 FITZHERBERT, supra note 177, at 131, 132; WILLIAMS, supra note io8, at 7I; THE COMPLEAT
SOLICITOR, supra note 70, at 72-73.
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same writ was later held unnecessary upon a statute merchant.20 Apart from these
differences, even elements of the Statute of Acton Burnell, such as the right to force a
jury of extendors to take over-valued property, applied to subsequent forms of
statutes.207 And execution was otherwise identical upon statutes merchant and staple.
3. Quasi-Recognizances: Collusive Debt Actions
By our period, recognizances were sufficiently distinct from their origins in
collusive debt actions that the latter had re-emerged as a distinct form of security.208
Such security involved a debtor confessing, either directly or by warrant of attorney, a
debt action brought by a creditor.20 Collusive debt actions had few obvious advantages
over traditional recognizances, except perhaps a greater certainty as to the availability
of capias. Some creditors may nevertheless have derived psychological comfort from
knowing that they had a truly identical procedural posture, with concomitant record, to
that of someone who had fully litigated an actual suit in debt.
ii. Sureties
Another widespread form of security, often coupled with other security, was the
binding of one or more sureties with a debtor.21 0 A surety was an individual who stood
liable for another's debt. Sureties were liable in assumpsit,211 but were typically bound
in an obligation, either independent of the principal debtor, or, more usually, as a
co-obligor with a principal in one bond, recognizance, or statute. Such liability was
typically joint and several, rendering a surety a co-principal at law. A creditor was
therefore not required at law to proceed against a principal first. When jointly and
severally liable, a creditor could sue the same or different sorts of execution against
principal and surety.212 Any co-liable parties still in execution were discharged by full
satisfaction of ajudgment, and full satisfaction meant either receipt of the full judgment
sum upon fierifacias or receipt of any lands in extent on an elegit, but apprehension of
only one debtor upon capias ad satisfaciendum where two or more were liable was not
considered satisfaction.213
Sureties were different from all other forms of security in an obvious way: they
involved a third party. All other securities involved only the creditor and debtor (capias
ad satisfaciendum practically involved third parties but did not legally involve them).
Third-party involvement accounted for the only significant disadvantages to sureties as
a form of security. A creditor incurred the cost not only of assessing the
206 
Anon (between 1689-1712) 91 Eng. Rep. 751; 3 Salk. 91; Anon. (1669) 86 Eng. Rep. 29, o; Vent 41, 42.
207 CO. LITT., supra note 36, at 29oa; see also Whitton v. Weston (ca. 1625) 123 Eng. Rep. 1179, 1181;
Bridg. J. 33, 35.
208 See BROOKS, supra note 128, at 312; CHRISTOPHER W. BROOKS ET AL., NoTARIES PUBLIC IN
ENGLAND SINCE THE REFORMATION 81 (1991).
209 For descriptions of examples see Moyle v. Knighton (6 December 1616) PRO C33/131, f. 226v
(transcription on file); Robinson v. Downes (i October 1616) PRO C33131, f 33 (transcription on file);
Bowtwell v. Webbe (8 November 1587) PRO C33/75, f. 132V (transcription on file)..
210 For more detail on the following part, see D.P. Waddilove, Credit before Banks: Suretyship in
Early-Modern England (working paper on file with author).
211 BAKER, supra note 128, at 384.
212 Foster v. Jackson (1615) 8o Eng. Rep. 201, zo8; Hob. 52, 59.; Cowley v. Legat (1613) 78 Eng. Rep.
150; Godb. 257; Anon. (1584) 74 Eng. Rep. 262; 1 Leo. Rep. 288; Anon. (1584) 74 Eng. Rep. 88, 818-19; 4
Leo. 197; but cf Rosser v. Welch (1613) 78 Eng. Rep. 126; Godb. 2o8 (C.P.).
213 Cf Whiteacres v. Hamkinson (1627) 79 Eng. Rep. 666; Cro. Car. 75; cases cited supra note 94.
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creditworthiness of his debtor, but also of his surety. And in the interpersonal economy
of our period described above,214 suing someone who had never had the benefit of the
credit in the first place might cause both social and/or economic difficulty for a creditor.
Putting such difficulties aside, a surety was otherwise excellent security.
iii. Mortgages and their Value-Preservative Function
The final form of security available in our period was the mortgage. As mentioned
above, the classical common-law mortgage was a conditional grant.215 A debtor
conveyed title to land216 to a creditor upon origination of a debt. This conveyance was
subject to a proviso that if the debtor repaid the debt by a certain day, the conveyance
would be void.217 By repaying, a debtor edeemed the mortgage, causing title to return
to him or her. By failing to repay, the debtor lost all right to the property leaving title
forever in the creditor.218 The conditional grant was itself the mortgage; it was a pledge
against default. As the active giver of the mortgage pledge, the debtor was called a
"mortgagor;" as the passive recipient of the pledge, the creditor was called a
"mortgagee."
The structure of the mortgage meant that the mortgagee technically owned the
property even before default. By holding legal title while the debt was outstanding, the
mortgagee was owner in the eyes of the law. But as everyone knows, a mortgagee's
true entitlement to the property began only upon default. A mortgagor thus normally
retained possession of the property.219 On its face, this looks like the parties were
ignoring their legal rights. But going deeper shows this was rarely the case.
Mortgages normally provided explicitly that a mortgagor should maintain
possession by one of a number of means.2 20 A mortgagee might covenant and/or give
a bond to a mortgagor to secure his or her possession.2 2' Or, even clearer, a mortgagee
might lease the premises back to a mortgagor for the duration of the mortgage.22 2 Such
a "lease-back" left the parties each with a legal right corresponding exactly to the intent
of the mortgage: a mortgagor had legal possession until the day the debt was due, at
which point the lease would expire, giving the mortgagee legal right to possession.2 23
214 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 12-13 and accompanying text.
216 Chattel mortgages also existed, but were typically called pawns. They differed little from mortgages
in most respects; indeed, the terms pawn and mortgage were sometimes confused in our period. See, e.g.,
"Mortgage" in COWELL, supra note 38 (defining "mortgage" as "a pawn of land or tenements, or any
thing[sic] moveable").
217 WEST, supra note 38, at H§ 409-10, 413-15, 417-419, 427-28. Sections 4og and 419, in addition to
providing a condition subsequent, also provide for shifting uses; section 417 combines a condition subsequent
and a covenant to reconvey.
218 THOMAS LITTLETON, THE NEW TENURES § 332 (London, 1481); see also id. at 205a note I.); WEST,
supra note 38, at §§ 409-10, 413-15, 417-419, 427-28.
219 See R.W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 89-9o (1931). It seems that he practice of a
mortgagor remaining in possession may have begun much earlier than Mr. Turner suggests. More work
remains to be done before anything more definite can be said. For reasons why Turner's work must be treated
with caution, see D.P. Waddilove, Emmanuel College v Evans (1626) and the History of Mortgages, 73
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 142, 146-48 (2014).
220 Cf infra note 281.
221 See, e.g., Loveden v. Hobbes (14 October 1616) PRO C33/131, f. 16 (transcription on file); WEST, supra
note 38, at § 419.
222 See, e.g., Wolmer v. Marriell (2 December 1616) PRO C33/131, f 215 (transcription on file); Bennell
v. Style (31 October 1587) PRO C33/75, f. 1o9v (transcription on file). Upon a mortgage in fee, the mortgagee
simply granted a lease. For a mortgage by long-lease, a mortgagee granted a shorter sub-demise.
223 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 42:13 (4 th ed. 2018).
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But if a mortgagor repaid on this day, the mortgagee's interest was extinguished and a
mortgagor had full title.224 If a mortgagor failed to repay, both the lease and the
mortgagor's right to redeem expired, leaving the mortgagee with absolute title.225 So
under a mortgage with a lease-back, legal title actually mirrored mortgage intent in all
respects. The prevalence of lease-backs remains uncertain, but clauses preserving a
mortgagor's possession were omnipresent.
Unlike other securities, a mortgage was a private transfer of property that took effect
without official intervention either to form the security or to transfer property upon
default. Of course judicial assistance might be necessary to obtain possession if a
defaulting mortgagor refused to surrender a property. But legal title changed hands
without court involvement. No other security had such automatic proprietary effect.
Also unlike other securities, a mortgage linked a debt with a specific asset; other
securities created a categorical, sometimes floating, charge. The focus of a mortgage
upon a specific asset had several benefits. It allowed a creditor to assess, ex ante and in
detail, the capital value of the asset relative to the debt to ensure recovery of adequate
value. Such assessment might be easier and so cheaper than assessment of a categorical
charge; one servant in our period deposed about the difficulty he had in assessing a
categorical charge: "[H]e hath had many weary Journeys concerning the said
debt & very chargeable to the said complainant his master especially in finding out the
lands liable to the said extent."226 Focus on a particular property might also
psychologically prepare a debtor to part with it, given its clear link to repayment of a
specific debt, easing the process of recovery. A mortgage also theoretically allowed a
creditor to recover more than the value of a debt. A mortgage absolutely linked the
pledged asset to repayment of a particular debt irrespective of the underlying values.
Other forms of security limited a creditor to recovery of the value of ajudgment. Equity
interfered with a mortgagee recovering too much,227 but at least some scope existed for
a mortgagee to do better than other types of creditors.
Finally, and crucially, because a mortgagor parted with legal title to property at
origination of the debt, a mortgage disabled a mortgagor from affecting that title during
the debt. A mortgagor thus could not sell, encumber, or otherwise alter the mortgaged
title until the debt was repaid. This had the effect of preserving the value of the title
from the time of the mortgage grant. Such value-preservative function is why a
mortgage had to take the form of a grant at the beginning of a debt rather than only
upon default. If the form were otherwise, the mortgagor could encumber the
asset-either intentionally or accidentally-rendering its value uncertain. In short, the
supposedly backwards quality of the transaction actually allowed it to do its job.
i. Risk of Encumbrances
The significance of the value-preservative function of mortgages in our period can
hardly be overstated. The structure of the law created a pervasive risk of encumbrances
to land that would diminish its value. As explained above, statutes, recognizances, and
debt judgments all charged a debtor's property (both land and chattels) even if the debt
were totally unrelated to the property. Land in Cornwall thus might be charged by a
statute acknowledged in London for a debt related to business in Northumberland. And
224 id
225 id
226 Dep. of Nathaniel Attwood in Smyth v. Ewens, E 133/114/27, 21 November 16iI.
227 See Waddilove, supra note 124, at 126-28; see also authorities cited infra note 271.
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there was no straightforward way to discover such encumbrances with certainty in an
era before a land registry.228 Parliament recognized and partially ameliorated this
problem when it created the previously mentioned central registry of statutes in 1584.229
But this still required travel to, or at least correspondence with, London to search the
rolls. And under the 1584 statute, conusors still had four months in which to enroll their
statutes,23 0 during which time valid encumbrances might not be discoverable. The
registry also covered only statutes. Bonds, with all their inherent likelihood of yielding
a debt judgment, left no public record. Indeed, any debt-even one incurred by
committing a tort-might yield a judgment at any moment that would encumber lands
via elegit. Even once a debt was crystallized in a judgment, it was still likely
undiscoverable: no known means of searching the records to determine whether a given
individual had an outstanding judgment has come down to us.231' Then there was the
even-trickier encumbrance of dower-the right of a widow to a life estate in one third
of her husband's freehold even if alienated during his lifetime-that attached any time
a married man became seised of land or a man seised of land became married.232 All
this leaves aside voluntary, intentional forms of encumbrance such as grants of
rent-charges or easements. These could be given without a trace of public record.
Encumbrances thus inescapably stalked legal titles to land in our period.
The risk of encumbrances was no secret to contemporaries. Even in the medieval
period a rhyme to aid purchasers of land in remembering their concerns included,
amongst many other things, care that land "stond in no dangere off no womans dower,"
and consideration "whether it stond in statute bownd."233 Awareness of the range and
risk of encumbrances led to many proposals for reform. In 1604 a bill "For the
Registring of Judgments, that may impeach Purchasers or Farmers of Lands" reached
a third reading in the House of Commons.234 But at that point the Prothonotaries of the
Common Pleas presented evidence against the proposal-because it would negatively
affect their take of fees-and the bill failed.235 Lord Keeper Francis Bacon tried again
in 1617 to establish an office of a general remembrancer who would create a registry of
221 Cf C. Van Bochove et al., Real Estate and Mortgage Finance in England and the Low Countries,
13oo-18oo, 30 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 9, 9 if. (2015) (incorrectly representing the Statute ofEnrolments 1536,
27 Henry VIII, c.io, as an attempt to establish a land registry, but correctly arguing that England lacked a
land registry or any other ready means of discovering encumbrances upon legal titles). On the actual purpose
of the Statute of Enrolments, see J.M. Kaye, A Note on the Statute ofEnrolments, 104 L. Q. REv. 617, 618
(1988).
229 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
231 Searching the plea rolls for a particular defendant would be utterly impracticable without at least a
good idea of when judgment might have been entered, and no indications of books that clerks might have
kept to aid the process survive.
232 
See A.K.R. KIRALFY, POTtER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 564-65 (4 th ed. 1958);
Kaye, supra note 228, at 625.
233 OXFORD, BALLIOL COLLEGE MS 354, p.2o6 , http://image.ox.ac.uk/images/balliol/ms354/2o6.jpg
[https://perma.cc/B4XY-83QK]. The Digital Index of Middle English Verse cites sixteen manuscript
examples of the rhyme, of which the above is only one. THE DIGITAL INDEX OF MIDDLE ENGLISH VERSE,
http://www.dimev.net/record.php?reclD-6640#wit-6640-3 [https://perma.cc/A37K-HQBE]. I am grateful to
Mr. Nicholas Le Poidevin QC for introducing me to the rhyme and providing a transcript of the version in
Lincoln's Inn Library.
234 1 HC Jour. (22 May 1604) p. 222, Col. I.
235 Id. ("The Bill much disputed, put to Question, and, upon Question, dashed, without one Yea."). The
reasons recorded against the bill were self-contradictory: "A New Office: - An ill Precedent: - Needless: - A
good Kalendar already: - Impossible, in respect of the Multitude of Judgment: - Unjust, in taking Fees from
the Protonotaries, which belong unto them." Id. The bill could hardly be needless on account of a good
calendar ofjudgments already existing when the task of registering judgments was also impossible!
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all encumbrances; but the project was excessively ambitious and foundered for several
reasons.2 36 Even in the general populace such proposals appeared, for instance, in 1654
a disenchanted barrister proposed, amongst various reforms of the law of debt and
credit, that: "That there [be] some place in every shire for Registering all Leases,
Bargains, Conveyances, Statutes, Judgements, Recognizances, and the like, which any
way concern the Lands in that Shire".237 Indeed, another proposal in 1671 explicitly
noted that:
[I]f a publick Registry or remembrance of all Conveyances and Incumbrances
on real estates were settled in each County all mischiefs and inconveniences
whatsoever by precedent Grants and Incumbrances, would be prevented to
Purchasers and Creditors unless it were by their own willful neglect..."238
But such proposals, numerous as they were, essentially never made any headway.239
Despite theoretical awareness of the risk of encumbrances parties were still often
caught unawares by them. The point is vividly illustrated by a case in Chancery, Bridge
v. Carew (1616), in which one of the easiest-to-discover encumbrances nevertheless
surprised a purchaser.240 William Bridge bought "one messuage and 8o acres of land in
Chesterton in the County of Cambridge" from William Carew, paying £550 of the E650
purchase price and giving a bond off2oo to secure the outstanding £loo.241 At the time
of sale, Carew "covenanted that the same [land] was discharged of all encumbrances
done by him." 242 But in fact he "had in November before the purchase acknowledged
a statute of 300" to one Thomas Hobson243 and never made [Bridge] acquainted
therewith at the time of the purchase[,] which statute [became] forfeited by the
non-payment of ioo" or thereabouts."2" Hobson therefore extended Bridge's newly
purchased lands under the statute. This forced Bridge to pay E4o to Hobson "for one
year's value of the land so extended" to maintain possession.24 5 Bridge, unsurprisingly,
then did not pay the remaining £ioo on the purchase price, causing Carew to sue on the
236 George William Sanders, An Historical Account of the Progress of Registration in England So Far
as Respects Assurances of Land, in REGISTRATION AND CONVEYANCING COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONERS 232-33 (1850); ANON., THE OFFICE OF GENERAL REMEMBRANCE (London, 1617). The
scope of the patent Bacon proposed to create the office was enormous, and would have been illegal in the
absence of supporting legislation.
237 J.F., THE LAWS DISCOVERY 5 (1653). This short pamphlet purports to be an epitome by "J.F." or "a
Well-wisher to his Countrey" of a longer treatise by a "Barrester, who partly through sickness, and partly for
Conscience, deserted the Profession of our Laws as Epidemically evil; he spent diverse of his last years in
supervising the defects thereof." Id. at 3. The pamphlet clearly demonstrates significant familiarity with
contemporary law.
238 NICHOLAS PHILLPOTT, REASONS & PROPOSALS FORA REGISTRY ORREMEMBRANCER 1-2 (1671); see
also WILLIAM LEACH, PROPOSITIONS FOR RECORDING AND REGISTERING OF DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES,
JUDGMENTS, STATUTES, AND OTHER INCUMBRANCES UPON LANDS AND TENEMENTS (1651) (proposing a
regional recording system for encumbrances in order to combat fraud.). For the view against reform see
Fabian Philipps, THE REFORMING REGISTRY (1662).
239 See Sanders, supra note 236, at 232-35. Only a few, limited, deed registries, applicable in only
particular regions, ever came into being; see Jean Howell, Deeds Registration in England: A Complete
Failure?, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 366,366-67 (1999).
24 Bridge v. Carew (28 October 1616) PRO C33/131, f ii7v. (transcription on file).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 The Hobson in question was most likely the eponym of the famous choice. See THOMPSON COOPER
& DORIAN GERHOLD, Hobson, Thomas (1545-1631), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/i34o9 [https://perna.cc/E6UF-8WLN].
244 Bridge v. Carew (28 October 1616) PRO C33/131, f ii7v (transcription on file).
245 id
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£200 bond securing that sum.246 Bridge exhibited his bill in Chancery for relief from
the bond suit alleging he was "both in danger to pay the money upon the bond and also
to have his lands still to continue in extent for the defendant's debt;"247 all of which the
"Court conceived to be very hard dealing in the defendant."248 The incident shows how
a lurking encumbrance could unexpectedly affect a third party, and exemplifies how
the risk of encumbrances could be realized.
The appropriate response to a known encumbrance was naturally to adjust the price
of the title. Had Bridge known that the land was charged by Hobson's statute, he should
have paid £ioo less (or whatever the precise sum necessary to discharge Hobson's
statute). Other Chancery cases illustrate the impact of encumbrances affecting the value
of title. In Ashebey v. Parramore (1592), a debtor exhibited a bill in Chancery when his
creditor allegedly improperly kept various obligations uncancelled:
And by reason that the statutes[,] recognizances[,] and bonds before mentioned
were remaining in the hands of the said defendant uncancelled and undefaced[,]
the said complainant could not make sale of any part of the said manor to satisfy
and discharge the said debt to the said defendant[,] for that those that would have
bargained with the said complainant feared that the said manor and lands would be
charged and liable to the said statutes and recognizances[;] By means whereof the
said complainant was enforced to make default of payment.249
In Dormer v. Calfield (1592), the plaintiff alleged that:
by reason of his being employed in her majesty's service [he] had been greatly
indebted and had been thereby enforced to make sale of some of his lands for the
payment of part of the same debt[;] And for the better assurance thereof stood
bounden to diverse and sundry persons to whom he had made sale of the same
lands in sundry recognizances and statues made for the warranties of the same
lands sold[;] By reason whereof his other lands then remaining in his possession
being subject to the said Recognizances and statutes were not so vendible as the
said lands and tenements called newberrie hill were[,] for that by the rigor of the
common law they [i.e. Newberry Hill] were not subject to the said
encumbrances.250
Encumbrances could, in short, destroy the value of title to property, while the
prevailing law of secured lending and execution of civil judgments created a pervasive
risk of them. A robust and certain mechanism for defending against these easily accrued
and difficult-to-discover impositions was thus necessary for title to function effectively
as collateral security.
2. Defense against Encumbrances
The ability of the mortgage to defend against encumbrances was simple: without
legal title, the mortgagor lacked capacity to encumber. The reason that Newberry Hill
in Dormer v. Caljield (1592) was uncharged by recognizances, and hence more
246 id
247 id
248 id
249 Ashebey v. Parramore (26 Jan. 1592) PRO C78/74/14, membrane 48-49 (transcription on file).
250 Dormer v. Califield (21 June 1592) PRO C78/74/ro, membranes 33-34 (transcription on file).
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"vendible," ultimately stemmed from its being mortgaged.25' Two further Chancery
cases exemplify mortgages' value-preservative function. In Addams v. Crowther
(1604)252 a certain Barnes had secured one of his sureties, Crowther, with a mortgage,
and afterwards secured another surety, Addams, with a statute. Both sureties had to pay
out, and in the ensuing contest over Barnes's assets, Addams sued Crowther in
Chancery because only in equity could his statute even possibly charge the mortgaged
lands:253 the mortgage indisputably defended the property from such encumbrances at
law.254 In Hill v. Hill (1600) the Chancery allowed late (equitable) redemption of a
mortgage.255 But while the property had been mortgaged the mortgagor acknowledged
a statute to the mortgagee, which statute could not charge the property because of the
mortgage.25 6 Both securities were therefore for the benefit of the same party, but the
prior mortgage defended against the later statute. When the Chancery effectively
stripped the creditor of his security interest in the mortgage by allowing equitable
redemption, the court also ordered:
the reassurances[sic] which is to be made of the said mortgaged lands shall be
made to the [mortgagor] and his heirs and not to any other person to his use to the
end it may be subject to a recognizance in the nature of a statute staple of sixteen
hundred pounds knowledged by the [mortgagor] to the [mortgagee] for the security
of the said lands by him purchased.25 7
Only that way could the statute charge the lands in light of the mortgage's ability to
defend against encumbrances.
Parliament specifically preserved the value-preservative function of mortgages
when it passed the previously mentioned statute of 1584 creating the central registry of
statutes.258 The primary purpose of that statute, called "An Act against covinous and
fraudulent Conveyances", was to stop conveyances made solely to defeat creditors.25 9
The statute explicitly exempted any "lawfull Mortgage, made or to be made bona fide
and without Fraud or Covin upon good consideration" from its provisions.26 It did so
because such value-preservative function was legitimate in keeping property away
from certain creditors, unlike the fraudulent conveyances that were its object of reform.
Indeed, the mortgage was so successful in defending against encumbrances that a
popular title-holding structure developed from it. Holding by a "satisfied term", which
became popular in the seventeenth century, saw a long lease granted by way of
mortgage not simply nullified upon redemption, but instead kept "on foot" and
conveyed to trustees to hold henceforth to the benefit of the mortgagor.261 The owner's
251 See id. at membrane 33.
252 sub nom. Crowther v. Addams (22 Oct. 1604) PRO C33 /1o8, f. 88; (1 July 16or) PRO C38/4.
(transcription on file).
253 id
254 A report suggests that Addams's argument in equity would have failed, Anon. (Undated) 21 Eng.
Rep. 5, but the point proved moot because Addams had in fact already received adequate recompense from
other of Barnes's assets. Crowther v. Addams (22 Oct. 1604) PRO C33/bo8, f. 88; (1 July 16oi) PRO C38/4.
(transcription on file).
255 Hill v. Hill (7 December 16oo) PRO C33/99, f 244v. (transcription on file).
256 id.
257 Id.
258 Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances 1584, 27 Eliz. 1, c. 4, §§ 5-7 (made perpetual 39 Eliz. i, c. 18).
259 Id.
260 Id. at § 4.
261 See D.E.C. YALE, Introduction: An Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity, in 2
LORD NoTTINGHAM's CHANCERY CASES 1, 150-160 (1961); Waddilove, supra note 219, at 152.
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rights in the property thus took the form of a beneficial interest in a trust of a redeemed
mortgage lease, combined with personally holding a reversion. This structure gave the
owner a strong title in several ways. First, the present possessory title (the redeemed
mortgage lease) had been effectively vouched for as a good title by a third party when
the mortgagee, who had had a personal interest, had accepted it as his security. Second,
from the date of the mortgage grant until redemption, the fact that the title had been in
mortgage meant that it had been defended from further encumbrances. Third, the title
was now defended from further encumbrances by being held in trust. The
value-preservative function of the mortgage thus made a former mortgage lease an
attractive title-holding device.
The ease with which encumbrances could accrue raises the question: why would a
mortgagor be willing to part with a title that he or she would normally expect to regain
and hold forever? Should a mortgagor not be at least as concerned as a mortgagee about
encumbrances created by the opposite party during a mortgage? The answer is yes. And
the ingenious form of the common-law mortgage had a solution to this problem as well.
In our period the mortgage grant was normally subject to a condition subsequent for
redemption.262 And trigger of a condition subsequent allowed a grantor to re-enter as
of his or her prior estate, thereby nullifying any mesne encumbrances by a
mortgagee.263 Covenants to reconvey, which lacked this effect at law, later became the
dominant mechanism of redemption, but by that time equity seems to have intervened
to eliminate encumbrances by a mortgagee.2M The basic form of the common-law
mortgage therefore allowed a mortgagor to hand over title with confidence the he or
she could get it back unencumbered.
iv. The Hierarchy of Securities
The forms of security set out above: bonds, recognizances, statutes, sureties, and
mortgages, constituted the basic range of securities available throughout much of
English history. Their specifics arrange them in a rough hierarchy of increasing
protection for creditors. It is worth setting out the hierarchy to emphasize the clear, and
logically interrelated, place of the mortgage within the legal context of the day.
At the bottom of the hierarchy was the bond, which did little more than give a
creditor a quicker and more certain path to judgment in debt. It did so by allowing the
more advantageous type of suit of debt sur obligation rather than debt sur contract.265
Bonds provided no certainty of assets charged because only at judgment were lands
charged by elegit, and only at the teste of afierifacias were chattels charged. Neither
of these dates were certain ex ante because a creditor had to succeed in his or her action
of debt first.
Recognizances were superior security because they functioned as a debt judgment
from the time of acknowledgement.266 They thus charged a debtor's property
immediately, giving a creditor greater certainty regarding assets that he or she could
reach. A recognizance conusee also had a better procedural posture than a bond obligee:
either the burden of litigation, or at least the burden of proof, was upon the debtor to
262 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
263 Co. LITT., supra note 36, at 201-02a-b; see also 202b n.(2).
264 PLUCKNET, supra note 6, at 607.
265 See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
266 See supra Subsection I.C.I.
2018--2019 455
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
contest the debt, depending upon whether the recognizance had been acknowledged
over a year previously.
Statutes Merchant were still better security.267 In addition to functioning as a debt
judgment like a plain recognizance, they allowed harsher execution. A statute conusee
could proceed against the body, goods, and lands of a debtor concurrently. A statute
conusee could also extend all of a debtor's lands, not merely a moiety as upon elegit,
and could obtain damages for expenses in holding lands that a tenant by elegit could
not. A statute conusee could also force a jury of extendors that overvalued lands to take
them at the rate they had assigned and repay the debt directly, again unlike elegit.
Statutes staple were particularly creditor friendly;268 they did not require a three-month
grace period before execution against a debtor's property like statutes merchant, and
were cheaper to boot. The only disadvantage to statutes was not so much the security
that they provided, but their relatively limited availability: statutes staple were available
only to staplers in a staple town; recognizances in the nature of a statute staple were
available to anyone, but only in London; and statutes merchant were available to
anyone, but only in market towns.
Sureties were a categorically different form of security because they involved a
third party.269 But apart from the social difficulties of involving a third party, sureties
provided good security because of the additional resources they exposed to execution.
For this reason, sureties were usually combined with some other form of security, and
thus stand somewhere parallel to the rest of the hierarchy of securities.
At the peak of the hierarchy of securities was the mortgage.2 70 It did the most to
eliminate a creditor's downside risk by giving a creditor the most direct means of
recovering the value of a debt. A mortgage charged an asset from the time that a debt
was incurred. And because a mortgage charged a particular asset, the cost of assessing
its value ex ante was likely to be limited, and a debtor might be more psychologically
prepared to part with it, reducing enforcement costs. Because the asset was simply
taken by the mortgagee upon default, it could be sold to raise its full capital value or
kept as desired, thus allowing both speed and a variety of options toward recompense.
And no judicial involvement was necessarily required to effect such courses. Mortgages
were also the only means by which a creditor could permanently seize a debtor's title
to land; other securities allowed a creditor only to take possession for a term upon
extent. Not only was a mortgage permanent and a tenancy by extent temporary, the
latter involved valuation by ajury where a creditor could make his or her own valuation
upon a mortgage. And that valuation might even theoretically allow a creditor to
recover more than the original debt. Thus while other securities might, depending on
the circumstances, charge a wider range of assets than a mortgage, a mortgage provided
the clearest and simplest means to recover a given value compared with any other
security in our period.
II. THE EFFECT OF EQUiTY ON MORTGAGES
The common-law mortgage did not, however, remain the relatively straightforward
security cum defense-against-encumbrances that it was as described above. Equity
267 See supra Subsection I.C.I.b.(i).
268 See supra Subsection I.C.I.b.(2).
269 See supra Subsection I.C.2.
27o See supra Subsection I.C.3.
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intervened. This section shows what effect equity had upon mortgages from the
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.
Sometime from the late sixteenth through the mid seventeenth centuries the Court
of Chancery developed the equity of redemption, a doctrine by which Chancery and
equity came to dominate mortgages and establish an effectively exclusive jurisdiction
over them.271 But this was no mere transfer of jurisdiction between courts. The equity
of redemption was an interventionist doctrine that radically altered the nature of
mortgages. The common law gave literal effect to deeds, including mortgage deeds.272
If a mortgage deed required repayment at a certain time on a certain day, the common
law interpreted it strictly. If a mortgagor's horse went lame riding to repay and he or
she arrived late, that was of no concern to the common law. The matter was simple: the
property was forfeit. The equity of redemption, on the other hand, looked to what it
deemed to be underlying substance of the mortgage agreement and gave effect to that
over legal interpretation.273 If a horse went lame, equity considered the underlying
financial interest of the mortgagee unaffected; the mortgagor might still repay principal,
with interest damages for delay, plus any costs incurred in litigation, leaving the
mortgagee whole. Equity therefore allowed a mortgagor to redeem even in breach of
the condition of redemption. The language of the deed was of secondary importance;
the Chancery deemed the deed merely a representation of a true intent that it gave
effect. This was a radical move. Professor Watt described the Chancery's maneuver
thus:
The equity of redemption does not bear the hallmarks of a restrained,
considered Chancery. It is the product of a radical policy-driven Chancery ... [I]t
simply ignores the legal deed by which the mortgaged land is conveyed to the
lender. Chancery's recognition and protection of the equity of redemption is a
barefaced disavowal of the legal form.274
And Professor Simpson wrote, as mentioned above, that "the Chancery freely
interfered with mortgage transactions with a complete indifference to the terms agreed
by the parties; in no branch of the law was the sanctity of agreement less regarded."275
As mortgage parties recognized that the Chancery gave effect to something other
than the express terms of mortgage deeds, over time they came to draft their mortgage
deeds differently. Rather than simply stating what they intended, they drafted deeds as
positioning devices to obtain desired results in equity. They did so in particular through
a few standard clauses.
One such clause was the condition of redemption. Conditions subsequent
disappeared and were replaced by personal covenants to reconvey.276 A condition
271 See Waddilove, supra note 219, at 142-43; Waddilove, supra note 124, at 118-19 and works cited
therein; SIMPsON, supra note 8, at 243-45; TURNER, supra note 219; YALE, supra note 261, at 31-32 ROBERT
MEGARRY & WILLIAM WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY III7-18 (Charles Harpum et al. eds, 8th ed.
2012).
272 
See BAKER, supra note 30, at 313; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 6o6; Edith G. Henderson, Relieffrom
Bonds in the English Chancery: Mid-Sixteenth Century, 18 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 298, 300-01 (1974); Simpson,
supra note 164, at 404; see also SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 93.
273 See T W.H. BRYSON, CASES CONCERNING EQUITY AND THE COURTS OF EQUITY 1550-1660, xxvii
(2oo); TURNER, supra note 219; Waddilove, supra note 124.
274 Watt, supra note 1o, at 80.
275 SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 246.
276 See Hazeltine, supra note 12, at xli, xliv; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 607; 2 LEOPOLD GEORGE
GORDON ROBBINS & FREDERICK TRENTHAM MAW, A TREATISE ON TH4E LAW OF MORTGAGES, PLEDGES,
AND HYPOTHECATIONS: FOUNDED ON COOTE'S LAW OF MORTGAGES 128-29 (1897).
2018-2019 457
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
subsequent was a device of land law to alter an estate. A covenant to reconvey was a
device of contract to create personal rights.2 77 The former had a proprietary effect; the
latter created a mere possibility of damages. A covenant to reconvey thus failed to
reflect the intent of a mortgage to shift ownership of property. Why did mortgage
parties do this? Two reasons. First-and it is difficult to disentangle the causal effects
here-a covenant to reconvey cohered with the use, mentioned above, of "satisfied
terms" as a title-holding mechanism.278 To use a satisfied term one needed the particular
title created through a mortgage by long lease, which a condition subsequent would
destroy; because it lacked proprietary effect, a covenant to reconvey would preserve it.
Second, and more importantly, parties knew that equity would give their arrangement
de-facto proprietary effect. The Chancery made a covenant to reconvey specifically
enforceable.279 The Chancery also effectively eliminated mesne encumbrances that a
mortgagee might incur during a mortgage as would a condition subsequent.28 0 The
personal obligation of a covenant to reconvey was also more consonant with the
Chancery's reasoning and enforcement as a jurisdiction that operated in personam.
Once mortgage parties knew that they would get everything they wanted in equity
through a covenant to reconvey, they used it-despite the fact that it was at a remove
from the proprietary effect of a condition subsequent that better reflected the true intent
of a mortgage.
A stronger example of equity's effect in distancing the terms of the mortgage deed
from the intent of the transaction related to the mortgagor's possession during the
mortgage. Because of equity, all reference to a mortgagor's possession before default,
be it by lease-back or other method, disappeared. Coote's Treatise on the Law of
Mortgages explains the phenomenon. A revision between the between the fifth (1884)
and sixth (1897) editions saw the insertion of this:
It was formerly usual to insert in mortgage deeds an express proviso to the
effect that it should be lawful for the mortgagor to retain possession, and receive
the rents and profits, until default in payment of the principal and interest on the
day fixed. But such provisoes[sic] are now generally omitted, for, having regard to
the disadvantages attending the position of a mortgagee in possession, and that,
apparently, the entry will entitle the mortgagor to redeem at once without notice or
interest in lieu of notice, it is generally considered that the risk of a mortgagee
entering within the period before default can be made, which is usually six months
from the date of the deed, is one which, in practice, it is not necessary to guard
against. The result is that a mortgagee at the present time can generally enter into
possession whenever he thinks fit to do so.281
Equity made a mortgagee's possession so pointless that reference to a mortgagor's
possession became redundant. Parties therefore again relied upon equity by not
addressing the topic explicitly. In the absence of explicit provision to the contrary, a
mortgage's grant of title therefore meant, at law, that "a mortgagee ... can generally
277 SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 242.
278 See supra text accompanying note 261.
279 SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 242.
280 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
281 2 ROBBINS & MAW, supra note 276, at 796-97 (internal citations omitted); 2 RICHARD HOLMES
COOTE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGE 789-90 (W. Wyllys Mackeson & H. Arthur Smith eds., 5th
ed. 1884).
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enter into possession whenever he thinks fit to do so." 282 Yet that was not, of course,
what the mortgage parties intended.
A final, and still clearer, example of how equity drove separation of expression and
intent in mortgage deeds was the redemption date. Expression of a genuine redemption
date gave way to a clause typically requiring repayment in six months-irrespective of
the intended term.283 This seems to have been simply to allow a creditor to initiate the
time-consuming procedure of foreclosure necessary in the equitable regime.284 This
six-month term was a lie; everyone knew it. But such lie was included in the deed in
order to get a result-the possibility of eventually reaching foreclosure in a reasonable
time-that the parties wanted under the interpretive regime of equity.
In each of these respects, because of equity, the mortgage became less direct, clear,
or honest than it had been under the common law. A covenant to re-convey failed to
reflect the intended automatic proprietary effect of redemption. A lack of provision for
a mortgagor's possession made a mortgage deed seem to grant immediate possession
to a mortgagee despite what everyone knew the parties intended. And the redemption
date became a simple falsehood, stating a six-month date understood to be a lie.
Because of equity the mortgage deed no longer said what it meant, but became a
positioning device to obtain a desired result in Chancery. In sum, as Chancery judges
altered the rules of contract from straightforward enforcement of plain meaning, parties
responded; the result was a form of transaction that, at least in respect of the three
clauses outlined above, could reasonably be called mendacious. But such mendacity
was a product of interventionist equity, not an inherent characteristic of the
common-law mortgage.
Ell. REASSESSING CRITICISMS OF THE COMMON-LAW MORTGAGE
In light of the above, we can now reassess the criticisms of the common-law
mortgage presented at the beginning of this article. In doing so, this section shows that
a combination of ignorance of both the legal context that explained the prima-facie
oddity of mortgages, and the changes in mortgage deeds caused by equity, led the
mortgage's critics to misinterpret it.
Given this article, some criticisms above are simply put to rest. Such is Professor
Plucknett's claim: "The fact that the mortgage was not a very satisfactory institution is
shown by the continued use of the mediaeval statutes merchant and staple."285 The
continued use of statutes says nothing of the satisfactoriness of mortgages. Statutes and
mortgages were different instruments. Whereas statutes involved formalities by public
officials and practical limitations on who could use them, mortgages could be
concluded privately by anyone. Whereas statutes categorically charged lands and
chattels, mortgages charged only specifically nominated property. Whereas statutes
rendered a debtor liable to imprisonment, mortgages involved no such possibility. And
most significantly, whereas statutes allowed a creditor to seize land only for a period
to raise profits, mortgages allowed a creditor to take title to land permanently. In short,
statutes and mortgages were different forms of security, created by different means,
282 2 ROBBINS & MAW, supra note 276, at 797.
283 MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 269-71; 2 ROBBINs & MAW, supra note 276, at 796-97. The practice has
persisted in some places; see KEVIN GRAY & SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 718 (5th ed.
2009).
284 MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 269-71.
285 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 608.
2018-2019 459
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
with different results, which creditors and debtors might select in different
circumstances as appropriate to their needs. Continued use of statutes therefore says
nothing of the satisfactoriness of mortgages. Other scholars' similar confusions are also
clarified.286
Also largely put to rest is Professor Rabinowitz's claim:
The origin of this obviously artificial device, which does not correspond either
to the true economic significance of the transaction or to the intention of the parties,
has never been satisfactorily explained. Nor is the reason for it quite apparent. Why
should a mortgage, given to secure a debt, take the form of an immediate and
absolute conveyance of the mortgaged property, when what is intended is a
forfeiture of the property to take effect in the future in the case of non-payment of
the mortgage debt?287
Of course this article is not concerned with the origin of the mortgage as such, but
it does show why the mortgage had the form of an immediate conveyance. Only by
taking such form could a mortgage preserve the value of a mortgaged title-and thus
effectively secure a creditor-in a legal setting that created a pervasive risk of
encumbrances to legal titles. The mortgage's prima-facie backward form was therefore
vital to achievement of its purpose. Realizing this uggests that other explanations for
the form of the mortgage-such as response to usury laws,288 copying Jewish or other
foreign law,2 89 or simply accidental response to unrelated developments in land
law290-are either incorrect or incomplete. Any explanation of the form of the mortgage
must take account of its value-preservative effect. Professor Rabinowitz's point is, in
short, answered by the mortgage's value-preservative function.
To the extent that the content of this article is necessary to explain the mortgage's
form, Lord Macnaghten's claim that "no one, I am sure, by the light of nature ever
understood an English mortgage of real estate"291 is thus in fact validated. The mere
light of nature could not penetrate the fog of the mortgage's odd first appearance. But
one can hardly expect every aspect of developed law to be so self-evident as not to
require explanation. To admit Lord Macnaghten's claim is thus not to admit the
frowardness of the common-law mortgage.
286 For instance, Professor Simpson was arguably even less accurate with his claim: "[Sitatutes were
used fairly extensively (as was elegit) to create what were in fact mortgages of real property." SIMPSON,
supra note 3o, at 87-88. The differences between both statutes and elegit and mortgages is evident. And
Professor M.M. Postan inaccurately claimed that the statute staple was a "handy instrument" for the
"hypothecation of land." M.M. Postan, Private Financial Instruments in Medieval England, 23
VIERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FOR SOZIAL- UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICTE 26, 30-31 (1930).
287 See Rabinowitz, supra note II, at I8o.
288 See EDWARD F. COUSINS & IAN CLARKE, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 17 (3d ed. 201o); BEN
McFARLANE ET AL., LAND LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1o67 (3d ed. 2015); NELSON, ET AL, supra
note 15, at 134.
289 J.J. POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES I-2 (London, ist ed. r785) (noting a
Jewish-origin theory, but preferring a Roman one); Rabinowitz, supra note ii. Powell's early and influential
treatise affected the views of many subsequent authors.
290 Accidental response to other developments is the implied cause of mortgage development in a
descriptive account of the doctrinal development first articulated by Maitland and repeated by many legal
historians since. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 119-24; see also BAKER, supra note 3o, at 311-
12; 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 128-31 (3d ed. 1923); PLUCKNETr, supra note
6, at 603-07; SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 141-43.
291 Samuel v. Jarrah Timber and Wood Paving Corp. Ltd. [1904] AC 323 (HL) 326 (appeal taken from
Eng.); see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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The remaining criticisms of the common-law mortgage are all grounded in a
singular idea that varies by degrees along a spectrum of intensity. It begins with the
diffuse notion that there was something not quite right about a mortgage-mortgages
were "clumsy"292-and intensifies to charges of mendacity, some strongly stated:
mortgages "pretended . .. to be something which they are not;"293 involved "a system
of documents which do not mean what they say;"2 94 "suffered from the incurable defect
that they employed formulas which contradicted the true nature of the operation;"295
were "mendacious;"2 96 or were, in Maitland's crowning phrase, "one long suppresio
veri and suggestiofalsi. "297 The core sentiment is that the mortgage was really a charge
upon property sui generis intended to allow a creditor to seize property upon default,
but the mortgage did not take such form. To an extent this accusation cannot be denied:
the common-law mortgage was not a pure hypothecary charge. But English law had no
hypotheca as such. Does this mean that the common-law mortgage should be
condemned or simply considered the English form of hypotheca? That depends on
whether the peculiar characteristics of the common-law mortgage really were
mendacious.
There are two ways in which the common-law mortgage might have been regarded
as mendacious. First, and most obviously, there are particular clauses in a mortgage not
intended for what they said. The quintessential example is the six-month redemption
date: no one intended a mortgagor to redeem within six months and everyone knew as
much.298 But as explained in Part II, such clauses were not inherent characteristics of
the common-law mortgage; rather, they were consequences of equity changing the
rules of contract. Indeed, after explaining the standard six-month redemption date,
Maitland himself acknowledged: "That is the worst of our mortgage deed-owing to
the action ofEquity, it is one long suppresio veri and suggestiofalsi. It does not in the
least explain the rights of the parties; it suggests that they are other than really they
are."299 But in such declaration Maitland rightly blamed the perversive effect of
equitable intervention; he cast no aspersion on the pure common-law mortgage.
Similarly Lord Bramwell attributed the "system of documents which do not mean what
they say" to "those who administered equity."oo The criticism that dissimulative
clauses like the six-month redemption date were mendacious is therefore valid, but
such criticism is properly directed at the effect of equitable intervention rather than the
common-law mortgage itself.
Second, and this is very similar to the first, one might consider the grant that was
the basic mechanism of the mortgage to be irretrievably mendacious: the backwardness
of the mortgage was itself a lie. The root of this notion is the idea that there was
dishonesty in the fact that a mortgage grant was not intended to take effect like other
grants. It did not mean to convey possession. But a traditional common-law mortgage
always made explicit that a mortgagor should retain possession, be it by lease-back,
covenant, or some other mechanism; only after equity intervened did provisions to this
292 See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 124;supra note 4 and accompanying text.
293 See SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 242.
294 Salt v. Marquess of Northampton, [1892] AC I (HL) 19 (appeal taken from Eng.); supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
295 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 6o6.
296 See SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 247.
297 See MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 269.
298 See id. at 269-70.
299 Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
300 Salt v. Marquess of Northampton [1892] AC I (HL) 19 (appeal taken from Eng.); supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
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effect disappear. Anyone who actually read the relevant deeds of a traditional common-
law mortgage would therefore understand exactly who was supposed to have
possession. It would take an exceptionally rigid view of a grant to say that deeds openly
declaring the rightful possessor were mendacious. In fact, necessary inseparability of
legal title and actual possession is just too simplistic a concept to ground serious legal
criticism. It had virtually always been possible to be seised of land without being
possessed of it or to be possessed of land without being seised of it:30 such division
had been utterly routine even centuries prior to our period in land-holding structures
based on feoffments to uses."* It was thus entirely straightforward to conceive of a
mortgage grant as a granting of title-granting a reified legal concept-apart from
possession.
Beyond defensive arguments that the common-law mortgage was not mendacious,
a positive argument exists that it was specifically honest-at least in the period under
consideration. In early-modern England there was a widely understood and intuitive
analogue to the mortgage as a grant of title without possession. A pawn was and is the
handing over of a chattel as security for a debt. While the history of pawnbroking before
the modem period has been under-researched, indications are that pawns were
extremely common;303 everyone from the crown to peasants seems to have pawned to
secure creditors.31 Just as today, a pawn creditor takes delivery of the pawn because
leaving it with the debtor creates an unreasonable risk to the pawn's value: a chattel
might straightforwardly be lost, stolen, sold, given away, hidden, damaged, destroyed,
or otherwise diminished in value. Despite taking it, a pawnee does not have full right
to the chattel, and the limited nature of the grant is understood. A creditor can safely
leave a debtor in possession of land: few if any of the same physical risks to a pawn
threaten land. But the same was not true of title to land. As Part I explains, title to land
was subject to a pervasive risk of encumbrances. So a creditor had to take delivery of
title to land just like a chattel. A mortgage was therefore simply a pawn of title. Indeed,
the analogy was physically embodied in our period. Mortgagors handed over title deeds
- those physical objects representing title.30 s So common did the practice become that
301 Shifts in the meaning of"seisin" and "possession" could belie this literal statement at certain times,
but the point remains that title and use of land had a long history of distinction.
302 See BAKER, supra note 128, at 653-86; BAKER, supra note 30, at ch. 14; J. M. W. BEAN, THE DECLINE
OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1215-1540 lo4-3o (1968); Joseph Biancalana, Medieval Uses, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE
(R.H. Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 1998).
303 One of the few sources to refer to pawnbroking in our period, although it does not treat the subject at
length, assumes that it is common. R. H. Tawney, Introduction, in THOMAS WILSON, A DISCOURSE UPON
USURY, I, 22, 33-34, 92, 126-27 (R. H. Tawney ed., 1925); cf An Act Against Brokers 1604, I Jac. I, C. 21.
One would expect significant treatment of pre-modern pawnbroking in ALFRED HARDAKER, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF PAWNBROKING, I-4o (1892), but it does not contain it;only the first 40 of its 367 pages address
the period before i8oo. And that treatment is both more popular than scholarly, and ranges sufficiently widely
that it says very little about England in our period.
3 
See, e.g., FOURTH REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS, PART I 292
(London, 1874) (Letter from Thomas Gondrey to the Earl of Middlesex (Nov. 2, 1636) (referring to "Jewels
pawned in the Low Countries" by the King); id. at 315 ("Draft of a letter to Lady Corbett about jewels &c.,
of the Earl of Somerset which were in pawn to her." Dated 7 June 1623); id. at 40 (a "Petition of the forty
members of His Majesty's Chamber in ordinary" reciting that they have not been paid in a year "and have
been put to such great expense for extraordinary services, that they have been enforced to pawn their goods"
dated 15 January 1641); HARDAKER, supra note 303, at 13-15 (presenting examples of medieval pawns by the
crown and other exhausted personages).
30s Mortgages typically required return of title deeds upon redemption. See, e.g., Biggen v. Holmesteed
(Oct. 13, 1587) PRO C33/75 f. 25v (transcription on file); WEST, supra note 38, at H§ 416, 418. The Chancery
also typically ordered mortgagees actually to return deeds. See Mason v. Wilmott (Nov. 15, I6oo) PRO
C33/99 f. 238v (transcription on file); Hayward v. Pawlett (1597), 1 Bryson 118.[231] (Ch.) 261; Biggen, PRO
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a "mortgage by deposit of title deeds" later became an equitable form of mortgage
lacking a written deed.306 A mortgagee's inability to use title to take possession of land
did not spoil the analogy: a pawnee also faced restrictions on what he or she could do
with a chattel pawned.307 A mortgage was thus nearly an exact analogue of a
widespread transaction in ordinary use. What could be more honest than that? A very
basic understanding of law and the relevant social context therefore clarifies the
mortgage grant to such an extent that it can hardly be called mendacious.
IV. CONSEQUENCE FOR MODERN MORTGAGE LAW
Redeeming the common-law mortgage from unwarranted criticism not only makes
for interesting legal history, it also demonstrates the need to reconsider basic mortgage
theory in modem America. This section considers how the leading sources of modem
mortgage law depend upon the criticisms debunked above, and it invites a fresh
consideration of basic mortgage doctrine today.
Different states have different conceptual and doctrinal theories of mortgage. A
"title-theory" state still operates with the common-law mortgage: a mortgagee holds
legal title for the duration of a mortgage, to be redeemed by a mortgagor upon
repayment of a debt.3 08 A "lien-theory" state applies the Chancery's view of mortgages
to an extreme: a mortgagee has neither legal nor equitable title-nor anything other
than a purely financial security interest in mortgaged property. Such interest takes the
form of a power of sale, by which the mortgagee can, after default, convey a mortgaged
title to a third party-not keep it-and that only after completion of a foreclosure
proceeding."o' An "intermediate-theory" state takes a middle ground, viewing title as
shifting to a mortgagee upon default, but not before.310 "[I]n practice the intermediate
theory seems to differ, little, if at all, from its title theory counterpart."" The main
theories of mortgage are therefore effectively title and lien theories.
The leading position on modem mortgage theory rejects title theory in favor of lien
theory. Professors Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman are the authors of the leading
treatise on mortgages in America (joined in their sixth edition by Professors Wilson
Freyermuth and Ann Burkhart).312 Nelson and Whitman were also co-reporters-on the
current Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, which entirely agrees with the
treatise." In neither work do they devote much attention to basic mortgage theory, but
where they do, they reject title and intermediate theories in favor of lien theory. They
C33/75 f, 25V (transcription on file ). But cf, Longford v. Earl of Shrewsbury (Jun. 15 1596) PRO C33/91 f.
157 (transcription on file), Tothill 132; 21 ER. 145; I Bryson IH8. [T95], 257.
30 See Russel v. Russel (1783) 28 Eng. Rep. 1121-22 (Ch.); I Bro. C. C. 269, 270; MEGARRY & WADE,
supra note 271, at 1129.
307 Relatively elaborate law developed regarding what a pawnee could do with a pawn before it was
redeemed. See "Mortgage" in WILLIAM SHEPPARD, AN EPITOME OF ALL THE COMMON & STATUTE LAWS
OF THE NATION 744-45 (London, 1656); see also Mores v. Conham (1609) 74 Eng. Rep. 946, 947; Ow. 123,
124; Co. LITT., supra note 36, at 89a.
308 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 199; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 (AM.
LAW. INST. 1997).
0 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 202-03; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1
cmt. a(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
310 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 208; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt.
a(3) (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a(3) (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
312 NELSON ET AL., supra note 15. STEVEN W. BENDER ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING
(2018), also continues to be updated but effectively does not treat basic mortgage doctrine.
313 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4. (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
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argue in their treatise: "[I]t probably makes little sense to advocate or perpetuate either
the title or intermediate theories. The former, after all, is largely a vestigial remain of
English usury law, while the latter ... is conceptually indefensible."3 14 The Restatement
takes the same view; indeed, much of §4.1 comment a, which addresses basic doctrine,
is taken directly from the treatise.315
Nelson and Whitman seem to come to their position in reliance upon a species of
criticism debunked in this article. Neither their treatise nor the Restatement ever
explicitly reasons against title theory other than by passing references to its antiquity
and self-evident impropriety. Both works casually refer, for instance, to title theory's
basis in "formalistic and conceptually problematic concepts of English history," and,
as mentioned, call title theory a "vestigial remain of English usury law."3 16 Little more
than these off-hand dismissals ground their rejection of title theory. Their rejection of
intermediate theory is equally sparsely supported. The Restatement simply treats
intermediate theory as though it were no different than title theory," while the treatise
dismisses intermediate theory with the unexplained assertion that its foremost
characteristic, shifting title upon default, combines "two utterly inconsistent
theories."" Nelson and Whitman's argument can be fairly summarized as: it is obvious
that the common-law mortgage was bad; mortgage theory is thus a choice among three
alternatives, only one of which-lien theory-is viable. They thereby propound a
species of the critical consensus against the common-law mortgage. And in so doing,
they make a weak argument. Rather than clearly arguing against title theory and for
lien theory on any sound normative basis of whatever sort, they rely upon the critical
consensus that this article has shown does not withstand scrutiny.
A better argument therefore must be made to determine what modern mortgage
theory should be. Many possibilities exist depending upon different normative
methods. Law and economics can suggest he most appropriate utilitarian doctrinal
structure, perhaps considering optimization of the secondary mortgage market. Critical
legal theories can consider how mortgage law expresses power relations between
various groups and how legal structures ought to be shaped in light thereof. Law and
psychology can tell us ordinary people's expectations of mortgages and how the law
should react to them. Traditional doctrinal analysis can help mortgage theory fit
traditionally desirable characteristics of law, such as predictability, certainty,
accessibility, fairness, and so on. But actually engaging in all of these analyses is
beyond the scope of this article. It is content to suggest hat, whatever else may be true,
a reassessment of basic mortgage theory should take place.
CONCLUSION
When understood in the proper context, the common-law mortgage was a rather
clever device. It took the basic concept of mortgage-if I do not satisfy my debt to you,
you get my land-and instantiated it legally as it had to in light of the prevailing legal
landscape. It took the form of an initial conditionally defeasible grant, thereby
' NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 209.
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES ch.4 , intro. Note (AM. LAW. INST. 1997) ("A principal
theme ofthis Chapter is that a mortgage creates only a security interest in real estate. This reflects the adoption
of the "lien" theory and the rejection of the "title" and "intermediate" theories of mortgage law.").
36 NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 209.
3" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a(3) (AM. LAW. INST. 1997).
31 NELSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 209.
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eliminating a pervasive risk of undiscoverable encumbrances that constantly threatened
legal titles; and thereby preserving the value of the title that was the asset pledged
against a debt. It did what was necessary for a creditor truly to be secured. Furthermore,
this somewhat technical legal reality worked in practice as simply as it could: a debtor
handed over title until he or she repaid. The process was symbolized by handing over
title deeds, just like a pawn. Criticisms that this was a backward or mendacious
arrangement are misplaced. The common-law mortgage was no more than private
ordering of existing legal concepts to achieve a particular result that other legal systems
have embodied in a specialized legal form. It was a clever and logical way to achieve
the basic concept of mortgage as necessary in a particular legal system. There was
nothing wrong with it.
Such an understanding is important both for its own sake and for its relevance to
modem law. Given the great significance of mortgages to the economy, society, and
law, both historically and in the present day, full appreciation of the basic nature of the
common-law mortgage matters per se. In a more applied fashion, better understanding
of the common-law mortgage re-frames thinking about the doctrinal basis of modem
mortgage law. The leading view on basic mortgage theory presents an under-theorized
preference for "lien theory" against "title theory" in a manner analogous to general bias
against the common-law mortgage. Such prejudice should be rejected. Once it is, a
serious question arises about what basic mortgage theory ought to be. It is therefore
time for a re-thinking of the matter. While that re-thinking may be done according to
any normative criteria, it should be done in light of the risk of repeating equity's
problematic move in systematically discounting parties' agreements.
Within the rehabilitation of the common-law mortgage appears a cautionary case
study of the effect of judges changing fundamental rules of contract. Systematic
equitable intervention into mortgages had the unintended consequence of driving the
true significance of such agreements underground, hidden beneath forms not openly
expressing their meaning, but instead calculated to achieve a particular result when
subjected to interpretative doctrinal machinery. Put differently, after equity took over
mortgages, parties took the doctrinal landscape into account; they drafted. their
agreements in the shadow of what the Chancery would do. And this caused the
mortgage to develop characteristics of dishonesty that this article has not tried to justify.
Doctrine and practice were thus in a hydraulic relationship that thwarted well-
intentioned Chancery innovations with bad side effects. One might reasonably assume
that parties will always react to the legal landscape in attempts to get he agreements
that they want. And to the extent that one might doubt the ability of doctrine to stay
ahead of the ingenuity of sophisticated and well-advised parties, a cautionary tale
appears for judicial ambitions of an interventionist nature in contract. Parties adapt
quickly; contract law works better by creating a stable framework for private ordering
than by intervening in response to content-specific trends.
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